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CONNECTICUT'S AFFORDABLE HOUSING 

APPEALS STATUTE: AFTER TEN 





TERRY 1. TONDRO* 
It is said ... that the effect of the [zoning] ordinance is to divert 
this natural development elsewhere .... But the village [of Eu­
clid], though physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politically a sep­
arate municipality, with powers of its own and authority to 
govern itself as it sees fit within the limits of the organic law of its 
creation and the State and Federal Constitutions.1 
Section 8-30g is not part of the traditional land use statutory 
scheme. Traditional land use policies did not solve Connecticut's 
affordable housing problem, and the legislature passed § 8-30g to 
effect a change.2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Connecticut Affordable Housing Appeals Act, section 8­
30g of the Connecticut General Statutes ("Appeals Act"), was 
adopted ten years ago.3 It has not had an untroubled history. The 
Act was the primary recommendation of the land use subcommittee 
of a Blue Ribbon Commission on Housing appointed by Governor 
O'Neill in 1989. I had the privilege of serving as the co-chair with 
Anita Baxter, the First Selectwoman of a middle sized town on the 
* © 2001 Terry J. Tondro, Thomas F. Gallivan, Jr. Professor of Property Law, 
University of Connecticut School of Law. The author expresses his appreciation for the 
work of research assistants in the preparation of this article, in particular Gregory Poi­
trus, Alexis Schuman, Ronald Soccoli, and Robert Grady. The Article as well as my 
understanding of affordable housing has been greatly enriched by working with attor­
neys Philip Tegeler and Timothy Hollister. The Article has benefited from their reviews 
and comments as well as those of Professor Colin Tait. Any errors are, of course, my 
own. 
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926). 
2. Wisniowski v. Planning Comm'n, 655 A.2d 1146, 1153 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995). 
3. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (1999) (originally enacted at 1989 Conn. Acts 311 
(Reg. Sess.)). 
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suburban fringe of Hartford. I was an academic specializing in land 
use controls, and lived in the City of Hartford itself. We were a 
politically balanced team. 
The Blue Ribbon Commission ("Commission") was estab­
lished in response to the increasing cost of housing in Connecticut.4 
One focus of that concern was the increasingly visible and intracta­
ble problem of homelessness.5 Of equal concern were the number 
of people who had access to a home, but who were paying an exces­
sive portion of their income for that access.6 At a slightly higher 
economic level, there was a concern that a continuing housing cost 
crisis would adversely affect the economy in Fairfield County on the 
New York border. Many large corporations have offices there, and 
were finding it difficult to lure executives to their headquarters be­
cause of the high-cost of living in the county. Arguments were also 
made that in the exclusive, high cost communities in the county, 
teachers, service staff, volunteer firemen, etc. were unable to afford 
to live in the communities in which they worked, and had to com­
mute long distances from an affordable town to their jobs in Fair­
field County. A third general argument was that those children 
growing up in one of these towns could not afford to live there after 
they left their parents' homes. While no other area of the state had 
such high housing costs as the towns in Fairfield County, the gen­
eral level of housing prices in the 1980s was very high prior to the 
significant and long recession in 1989, and for several years 
thereafter. 
The legislation proposed by the Commission in response to the 
problem of high housing costs was premised on the idea that zoning 
regulation of affordable housing should be simplified to reduce the 
number of generalized or indeterminate reasons that could be used 
to defeat a proposal to build affordable housing, reasons such as 
that the development would adversely affect community character, 
or that it was unsuitable at the location proposed, or that it was 
incompatible with the neighborhood. We did not go as far as many 
commentators have in the 30 years since "exclusionary zoning" was 
first attacked for its racial and class biases and argue for the elimi­
nation of zoning altogether;7 we were simply trying to pare it back 
4. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N, STATE OF CONN., HOUSING REPORT 2 (1989) [herein­
after BRC IJ. 
5. Id. at 19. 
6. Id. at 8. 
7. Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands; Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protec­
tion, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 767 (1969). Sager inspired an extensive 
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to its core ideas of separating basic land uses to prevent nuisances, 
but only if the countervailing interest was the provision of afforda­
ble housing. 
The Act that our subcommittee proposed was so controversial, 
however, that the life of the entire Commission was extended by a 
year, in large part to gather support for the Act.8 The Act passed 
the second time around, but with some necessary compromises de­
spite the very strong support of Governor O'Neill and the legisla­
tive leadership. In its first 10 years, the Appeals Act was 
interpreted in some 50 reported decisions by Connecticut trial 
courts, plus three appellate court and two Supreme Court decisions, 
which upheld its9 basic provisions. 
In 1999, more or less on the tenth anniversary of the introduc­
tion of the Appeals Act, the Connecticut Supreme Court dealt it a 
crippling blow in Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. 
Town Council.lO Some might say it was fortunate that a month ear­
lier the Connecticut legislature had authorized the creation of a 
new Commission to study the affordable housing problem in Con­
necticut, including an examination of how section 8-30g had 
worked. The 1999-2000 Blue Ribbon Commission ("BRC II") sub­
mitted 36 recommendations to the Connecticut Legislature dealing 
literature. A "law and economics" view began appearing at the same time, with well­
known articles by Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. & ECON. 71 
(1970), and Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and 
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1973). The result has been a much 
more critical attitude toward land use law by legal academics from both poverty law and 
market oriented critics. See, e.g., Orlando E. Delogu, Local Land Use Controls: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 36 ME. L. REV. 261, 261-65 (1984). 
8. BRC I, supra note 4, at 2. 
9. Kaufman v. Zoning Comm'n, 653 A.2d 798, 820-21 (Conn. 1995) (finding that 
the commission failed to prove that denying "the plaintiffs affordable housing applica­
tion was necessary to protect substantial public interest"); W. Hartford Interfaith Coali­
tion, Inc. v. Town Council, 636 A.2d 1342, 1356 (Conn. 1994) (upholding the plaintiffs 
right to appeal the rejection of its affordable housing applications without first submit­
ting a modified proposal); Town Close Assocs. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 679 A.2d 
378, 384-85 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (stating that the planning and zoning commission 
bears the burden of proof on appeal); Nat'! Associated Props. v. Planning & Zoning 
Comm'n, 658 A.2d 114, 121 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (finding that section 8-30g does not 
require an affordable housing applicant to obtain approval from all relevant municipal 
agencies prior to requesting a zone change); Wisniowski v. Planning Comm'n, 655 A.2d 
1146,1154-55 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (stating that section 8-30g(c) limits a local commis­
sion's discretion, and allows a trial court to grant a zone change if the commission fails 
to meet the burden of proof). 
10. 735 A.2d 231, 254-55 (Conn. 1999) (finding that the protection of open space 
may be a reasonable cause for denying a permit to build affordable housing). See infra 
Part V for a detailed discussion of this decision. 
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directly with the Appeals ACt.11 
I will begin this Article by exploring briefly the design of sec­
tion 8-30g as initially enacted, and comparing it with the already 
existing legislative and judicial efforts to promote affordable hous­
ing in Massachusetts and New Jersey. Massachusetts' so-called 
"anti-snob zoning" act,12 and New Jersey's program deeply rooted 
in the Mount Laurel cases,B were well known to us, and were part 
of the backdrop against which we developed our own proposal. 
Also important were the particular aspects of Connecticut's zoning 
law. Then I will discuss the Appeals Act's reception by Connecti­
cut's towns, its planning community, and its courts, followed by a 
review of the evidence of the effect of the Appeals Act on the crea­
tion of affordable housing opportunities during the initial 10 years 
after adoption. The third topic I will discuss is the Supreme Court's 
decision in Christian Activities Council, Congregational,14 the re­
sponse of the second Blue Ribbon Commission to that decision in 
its report of February 2000, and the legislature's subsequent amend­
ments to the statute. Finally, the Article concludes with some re­
flections on the failure of our "free-market" approach to break 
down the barriers to affordable housing, why the towns failed to 
respond to our invitation to negotiate over the details of affordable 
housing proposals, and the now lessened prospects for resolving the 
affordable housing problem in Connecticut. 
I. THE DESIGN OF SECTION 8-30g 
The structure of section 8-30g is relatively simple.15 It estab­
lishes an appeals' procedure with few (albeit very important) differ­
ences from the standard administrative appeal process available 
when a land use commission denies a garden-variety land use per­
mit.16 The section 8-30g procedure is only available to applicants 
who submit an affordable housing application that requires a per­
mit or other approval from any municipal agency that exercises 
11. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N, STATE OF CONN., FINAL REPORT 9-15 (Feb. 1,2000) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter BRC II]. 
12. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.40B §§ 20-23 (1998). 
13. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 
(N.J. 1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel II]; S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of 
Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel I]. 
14. 735 A.2d at 254-55. 
15. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (1999). 
16. Compare the appeals procedure in section 8-30g with the procedures for regu­
lar land use permits in sections 8-8 through 8-10. 
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zoning or planning authorityP But if any part of,the work involves 
an inland wetlands, an inland wetlands permit is required for the 
project in addition to zoning and planning approvals, and the wet­
lands permit would be issued by a Connecticut Inland Wetlands 
Agency, rather than by a zoning and planning commission.18 An 
Inland Wetlands Agency has an effective veto over a project, but 
the decisions of an Inland Wetlands Agency are not subject to the 
special Appeals Act procedure.19 The Commission recognized this 
limitation on the scope of section 8-30g, but also recognized that 
because the proposal would be strongly opposed by the municipali­
ties in the legislature, the proposal should not alienate the environ­
mental community as well. 
An affordable housing application is statutorily defined as re­
ferring either to a governmentally assisted housing development for 
low- or moderate-income people, or a housing development in 
which at least 25% of the dwelling units would be conveyed by 
deeds with covenants.20 The covenants ensured that the units 
would be rented or sold at prices deemed to be affordable, defined 
as prices not more than 80% of the median sale or rental price in 
the "area" or in the state, whichever was less, for at least 30 years 
after the initial occupation of the proposed development.21 In 1995, 
the definition of an affordable housing development was modified 
so that 25% (up from 20%) of the units had to be affordable in 
projects without governmental assistance for at least 30 years (up 
from 20 years).22 
The force of the special section 8-30g procedure lies in its shift­
ing of the burden of proof from the applicant to the planning and 
zoning commission. Instead of the applicant having to establish 
that the commission acted irregularly and in abuse of its discretion 
when it rejected an application for an affordable housing develop­
ment, the commission must "prove, based upon the evidence in the 
record" that four tests have been satisfied: (1) the decision and the 
reasons cited for it must be supported by sufficient evidence in the 
record; (2) commission rejection of an affordable housing applica­
17. § 8-30g(a), (b). 
18. §§ 8-26, 22a-32, 22a-33, 22a-34. 
19. § 22a-34. 
20. § 8-30g(a)(1)(B). 
21. §§ 8-30g(a)(1)(B), 8-39a. 
22. 1995 Conn. Acts 280 (Reg. Sess.). See John Rappa, State of Conn. Office of 
Legislative Research, Housing Projects Developed Under the Affordable Housing Land 
Use Appeals Procedure 2 (July 3, 2000) (on file with author). 
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tion must be "necessary to protect substantial public interests in 
health, safety or other matters which the commission may legally 
consider; [(3)] such public interests clearly outweigh the need for 
affordable housing; and [(4)] such public interests cannot be ade­
quately protected by reasonable changes to the affordable housing 
development. "23 This reverses the normal zoning (and general ad­
ministrative law) rule that the public agency goes into litigation 
armed with a presumption that it acted rationally and properly, and 
the applicant has the burden of establishing otherwise.24 It was this 
shifting of the risk of non-persuasion that drew the ire of many mu­
nicipalities and legislators.25 
23. § 8-30g(c). After 1995, projects not receiving governmental monetary support 
could not take advantage of the burden-shifting rule if the project was located in an 
area zoned exclusively for industrial uses. 1995 Conn. Acts 280 (Reg. Sess.). 
24. A modern statement of the presumption is found in United States v. Carolene 
Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For a discussion of implications of the 
presumption in land use law and of its corrective, a shifting of the burden of proof, see, 
e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitution­
ality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 7-18 (1992); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
512 U.S. 374, 405 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (presumption of constitutionality of a 
municipal action). Carol Rose suggests that imposing the burden of proof on a local 
legislative body, such as section 8-30g does, treats local legislative bodies as inferior 
legislatures. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a 
Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837,852 (1983) (discussing the signifi­
cance of burden shifting, as suggested by the decision in Fasano v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 29-30 (Or. 1973) (en banc)). She implies that such a view would 
be undesirable, id., and I agree. But the Commission was not taking the view that 
municipal legislative bodies are inferior to state agencies; rather, we were simply limit­
ing a municipality'S ability to ignore affected groups that are not part of its constituency 
but which are affected by its decision - out-of-towners, future residents, and the poor. 
We were attempting to control despotic behavior by zoning boards in those contexts, 
behavior that victimizes people who cannot have a vote in electing the despots. 
25. E.g., Rep. (now Judge) Radcliffe: "[T]his, [then] would be a new rule of law 
not applicable to any other state or municipal agency and certainly not consistent with 
the Administrative Procedure Act ...." Rep. Tulisano responded, "[A]bsolutely true 
...." 32 H.R. Proc., pt. 30, at 10,586 (Conn. May 30, 1989). Rep. Rogg asserted that in 
this bill, "we are reversing the whole [zoning] process." Christian Activities Council, 
Congregational v. Town Council, 735 A.2d 231, 257 (Conn. 1999) (Berdon, J., dissent­
ing) (quoting 32 H.R. Proc., pt. 30, at 10,666-67 (Conn. May 30, 1989)). Shifting the 
burden of proof is not unknown in American or Connecticut law, however unusual it 
may be. The burden imposed on the municipality by Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 
at 394-95, to establish a nexus between the problem and the measure adopted to resolve 
it amounts to a shifting of the burden of proof to the municipality, for example. Simi­
larly, so does the "change of circumstances" zoning rule prevalent in some states, which 
prohibits a land use agency from changing the rules unless it can establish that circum­
stances had changed since the original rule had been adopted. Since 1987, Connecti­
cut's Inland Wetlands Act has required a wetlands agency to establish that there is no 
feasible or prudent alternative to the applicant's proposal. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a­
41(b) (1999). This must be established before it grants a wetlands permit, after holding 
a public hearing on the application. TERRY J. TONDRO, CONNECfICUT LAND USE REG­
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Towns in which 10% of the housing units qualified as afforda­
ble housing were exempted from the burden-shifting rule. This ex­
emption was added for administrative reasons. We felt that towns 
with that much affordable housing (relatively speaking, of course) 
should not have to shoulder the burden of proving that they denied 
applications for proper reasons.26 In keeping with this desire to 
minimize administrative demands under the new procedure, afford­
able housing was defined to include only subsidized housing, or 
housing with deed restrictions limiting its use to low- and moderate­
income persons. We recognized that there is a lot of affordable 
housing in towns that would not qualify as affordable under this 
somewhat artificial definition, but the alternatives seemed adminis­
tratively cumbersome or even impossible. For example, a housing 
unit that is available at an appropriately low rent level today, or this 
year, might not be next year. If such units counted as affordable 
housing for the purposes of meeting the 10% exemption from bur­
den shifting, a new survey of available housing and prices would 
have to be undertaken each year by each of Connecticut's 169 
towns or by an agency of the state. The 10% number is considera­
bly marked down from the percentage of housing that needs to be 
affordable under the income and housing cost limits established by 
the legislature. Nevertheless, the 10% exemption concept has 
turned out to be a major problem in gaining acceptance of the Ap­
peals Act-our concern for simplicity of administration has turned 
out to be less of a statutory virtue than simplicity of explanation. 
The Act would have fared better if it had not exempted anyone 
from the statute under any circumstances. 
This is all there is to the affordable housing appeals procedure. 
The Appeals Act used some key concepts that are not statutorily 
defined, such as "substantial interest" in "health or safety." These 
terms are crucial because a commission's rejection must be based 
on the protection of such interests. By leaving the terms undefined, 
it became the legislature'S, and ultimately the courts', responsibility 
to identify in particular contexts which interests were substantial 
public interests and which interests involved health and safety. We 
ULATION 284 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 2000). When civil rights statutes are involved, a 
town is required to establish an absence of discriminatory intent once the plaintiff has 
established the fact of disparate treatment. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. 
Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 939 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per 
curiam). 
26. BRC II, supra note 11, at 23 (stating the reason for the 10% exemption 
provision). 
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did propose part ,of a definition for the affected interests by omit­
ting the term "welfare" from the usual trilogy of "health, safety and 
welfare" because it had become the usual justification for all kinds 
of decisions; we considered it too malleable a term. Some of the 
interests the courts have since held to be substantial include protec­
tion for housing units located in a flood plain27 or on steep slopes,28 
and compliance with sedimentation and erosion controls.29 An ap­
plicant's failure to consider the traffic30 or the environmental im­
pacts of its proposal have been upheld as legitimate reasons for 
rejecting the application.31 Other legitimate reasons have included 
an inadequate water supply32 or inadequate sewage treatment facil­
ities.33 Commission arguments that would have been upheld in a 
normal land use appeal, but which have been rejected in an afforda­
ble housing appeal, include a town's argument that approval of an 
affordable housing application would result in an adverse impact on 
property values or an increase in local school population.34 Several 
reasons given for a denial of an application have been upheld in 
some instances and overruled in others.35 Interests the courts have 
27. United Progress, Inc. v. Borough of Stonington Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 
No. CV 92-0513392S, 1994 WL 76803, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1994). 
28. Wisniowski v. Planning Comm'n, 655 A.2d 1146, 1148 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995). 
29. Nizza v. Town of Andover Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 930526193, 
1994 WL 421458, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 1994). 
30. Mackowski v. Stratford Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 96334661, 1998 
WL 828109, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1998), rev'd, 757 A.2d 1162 (Conn. 2000) 
(finding insufficient evidence to support traffic claim). 
31. Indian River Assocs. v. N. Branford Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 91­
0392496S, 1992 WL 108763, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 8, 1992). 
32. Greene v. Ridgefield Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 8 CONN. L. RPTR. 137 
(Super. Ct. 1993). 
33. Mackowski, 1998 WL 828109, at *6 (sewer); D'Amato v. Orange Plan & Zon­
ing Comm'n, No. CV 92-0506426S, 1993 WL 45042, at *5-6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 
1993) (sewage treatment). 
34. Barberino Realty & Dev. Corp. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n (Farming­
ton), No. CV 930526841 S, 1994 WL 547537, at *10-11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 1994); 
Shapiro Farm Ltd. P'ship v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n (N. Branford), No. CV 92­
0517281 S, 1993 WL 452234, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1993) (increase in school 
population); Pratt's Corner P'ship v. Southington Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. 
CV92 0508877 S, 1993 WL 229752, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 21,1993) (devaluation 
and increase in school popUlation). But see Beach v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n 
(Milford), 103 A.2d 814,817 (Conn. 1954) (holding that a subdivision application could 
not be rejected by the town for the reason that the development would impose "addi­
tional financial burdens" on the town, including increased school and road costs). 
35. See Town Close Assocs. v. New Canaan Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. 
CV93 0527279 S, 1995 WL 250116, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 1995), affd, 679 
A.2d 378 (Conn. App. 1996) (rejecting that adverse impact of traffic generated by the 
project was an adequate reason for denial by the commission); United Progress, Inc. v. 
Borough of Stonington Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 92-0513392S, 1994 WL 
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not considered substantial include the development's illegality 
under existing zoning regulations (as it would defeat the purpose of 
the Appeals Act if it could not prevail over existing zoning rules);36 
including inconsistency of the proposal with the town's zoning regu­
lations because they required a higher percentage of affordable 
housing units than the statute did;37 an asserted need of the town to 
study for a 3 year moratorium period the impact of multi-family 
units;38 limiting the number of affordable units in the municipal­
ity;39 and the need to have affordable housing near community fa­
cilities.40 The courts have proven to be quite fair judges of 
pre textual and legitimate reasons, which is perhaps the key to the 
gradual acceptance of the initially shocking shift in the burden of 
proof. 
As noted above, the fourth burden the municipality must carry 
is a finding by the commission that the public interests relied on 
when it rejected an affordable housing application could not be pro­
tected by making reasonable changes in the proposed plan. We had 
hoped that this requirement would encourage commissions and de­
velopers to find a negotiated plan that both could accept. One ob­
stacle is that Connecticut courts have not enforced the requirement 
of most land use statutes that a commission must state the reasons 
for its decisions. Instead, Connecticut courts have held that if a 
commission does not give reasons for its decision or if the reasons it 
does give are illegal, the trial court on appeal must search the re­
cord to determine if a legitimate reason could be supported by the 
76803, at *16-19 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1994) (giving unique historical and architec­
tural characteristics as one of several proper reasons for denial of application); Nat'l 
Associated Props. v. N. Branford Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV92 0518954 S, 
1993 WL 489486, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 1993), affd, 658 A.2d 114 (Conn. 
1995) (denying application due to architectural standards rejected by the court). 
36. W. Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council, 636 A.2d 1342, 1347­
50 (Conn. 1994). 
37. Indian River Assocs. v. N. Branford Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 91­
0392496S, 1992 WL 108763, at * 9 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 8, 1992). In 1995, the legisla­
ture amended the Act to increase the required number of affordable housing units from 
20% to 25% of an unsubsidized development. 1995 Conn. Acts 280 (Reg. Sess.). 
38. TCR New Canaan, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n (Trumbull), No. CV 
384353, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXlS 683, at * 64 n.23 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 1992). 
39. Nat'l Associated Props. v. N. Branford Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 658 A.2d 
114, 119 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995). 
40. Greene v. Ridgefield Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 90-04421315,1993 
Conn. Super. LEXIS 108, at *24 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 1993) (stating that the com­
mission based its denial on a distance to community facilities of 1.2 miles, but the court 
did not believe the distance outweighed the need for affordable housing). 
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evidence in the record.41 
In a situation where the commission can turn down an applica­
tion without giving its reasons, or where the only reason given is 
protecting the "public welfare," the commission is in a very strong 
position if it does not like a project for the most unacceptable of 
reasons. Connecticut commissions, knowing that they would not be 
penalized for failing to give the reasons for their decision and that 
their decision was afforded the presumption of regularity if ap­
pealed, had no reason to accommodate a developer whose proposal 
they did not like. By requiring the commission to state the reasons 
for its decision,42 and by shifting the burden of proof as to the legiti­
macy of the reasons for the rejection of an affordable housing 
plan,43 the Appeals Act weakened the position of land use commis­
sions vis-a-vis applicants. The Appeals Act made it possible for the 
town to lose when a case did corne to trial, as opposed to the former 
near-certainty that it would win an appeal from its decision. The 
first Commission hoped that this shift in relative bargaining 
strengths would result in greater cooperation between developers 
and commissions, if for no other reason than mutual self-interest. 
Better plans would result, and housing that would meliorate the 
housing crisis would be completed sooner than if the traditional de­
veloper-versus-commission confrontation model continued to be 
the practice.44 
The Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington 45 
case, at that time recently decided by the Second Circuit, provided 
a helpful structure for analyzing land use decisions under the fourth 
criterion of the Act.46 That case divided the reasons for rejecting an 
41. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of Connecticut 
cases which have held so. 
42. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (c)(I)(A) (1999). 
43. § 8-30g(c). 
44. In Fiscal Year 1987-1988, resolution of the average zoning case took about 450 
days, or 15 months, from the time of filing to the announcement of the decision by the 
trial court. BRC I, supra note 4, at A-5. That significant delay counseled a developer 
to comply with a commission's decision because the long delay necessary to win an 
appeal even if the developer was right was often just too costly. Cf Michael Wheeler, 
Negotiating NIMBY's: Learning from the Failure of the Massachusetts Siting Law, 11 
YALE J. ON REG. 241 (1994) (discussing the Massachusetts siting law involving bargain­
ing by developers, and negotiation requirements, and why the statute failed). 
45. 844 F.2d 926, 939 (2d Cir. 1988), affd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam) (stating 
the two prong test from Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148-49 (3d Cir. 
1977». 
46. § 8-30g(c) (requiring the commission to prove four facts, the fourth of which, 
in paragraph D, requires proof that the public interests allegedly being protected by a 
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application into site-specific and plan-specific categories. A site­
specific reason would be that the slopes on the site were too steep 
such that no rearrangement of lot lines could produce buildable 
lots. A plan-specific reason would be that many of the slopes were 
too steep, but that rearranging the lot lines could produce buildable 
lots. Aware of this distinction, the Commission's objective in the 
fourth requirement was to prevent the rejection of an application if 
there were reasonable changes that could be made in the plan. 
One effect of the section 8-30g design was the creation of a 
"builders remedy," as developed in New Jersey's Mount Laurel 
cases.47 Connecticut's statute gives any affordable housing appli­
cant an appeal right buttressed by the shift in the burden of proof 
from that pertaining to normal zoning appeals. We did not create 
an administrative agency such as the Fair· Housing Council that 
eventually took over the supervision of affordable housing in New 
Jersey, nor did we explicitly or implicitly incorporate any "fair 
share" or other measurable obligation on any town. We were cer­
tain that establishing an administrative agency to determine the af­
fordable housing obligation of each town would be politically and 
administratively unfeasible. Instead, we relied on the market sense 
of the builder as a surrogate for the affordable housing need in a 
town; if the builder was willing to proceed with an affordable hous­
ing project there was probably a market in that town for that 
product. 
A positive side of making the builder the affordable housing 
"planner" is that we did not need any state agency to make need 
determinations. We would also not be drawn into the interminable 
arguments like the ones presented before the New Jersey courts 
and then before the state agency over which statistics, methodology, 
etc., were to be used in deciding an appea1.48 As a student of af­
fordable housing negotiations commented about the Massachusetts 
commission's denial of an affordable housing application "cannot be protected by rea­
sonable changes to the affordable housing development"). 
47. Mount Laurel II, at 420 (giving builder's remedies where the plaintiff has ac­
ted in good faith and tried to obtain relief without litigation); Mount Laurel I, at 734 
(leaving the remedy up to the local municipalities and builders). 
48. See Jerome G. Rose, The Mount Laurel II Decision: Is It Based on Wishful 
Thinking?, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 115, 125 (1983) (describing the New Jersey procedure as 
"statistical warfare"); see also Sharon Perlman Krefetz, et aI., Suburban Exclusion in 
the 1990s: High Walls, Small Toeholds 10-11 (Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 1990) (unpublished paper 
delivered at the 1990 annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association) 
(on file with the Western New England Law Review) (describing the New Castle, New 
York litigation and its aftermath). 
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approach compared with that of New Jersey, "[t]he Massachusetts 
approach . . . avoided the difficult question of defining regional 
boundaries, overall housing needs, and fair share obligations."49 
The Massachusetts approach simply established an administrative 
agency within the State's Department of Housing which heard all 
affordable housing appeals from adverse local zoning commission 
decisions. We tried to emulate the simplicity of the Massachusetts 
model. 
On the other hand, the downside of relying on the developer to 
do affordable housing planning is that the developer's decisions 
about where to build will almost always be based simply on market 
considerations, such as which land is available, its cost, etc., rather 
than on planning considerations such as where it is best to provide 
housing for low- and moderate-income families. Of course, non­
profit sponsors or developers (who presumably will take a broader 
view than a for-profit developer might) can also use the statute, and 
have done so. Two of the three Connecticut Supreme Court deci­
sions concerning the statute were brought by non-profits. 50 
It has been suggested many times that the Appeals Act's spe­
cial procedures should be limited to non-profits. There are two 
problems with this proposal. One is that non-profits have built a 
very small number of affordable housing units during the Appeals 
Act's regime. For example, West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. 
involved 10 units, and Christian Activities Council, Congregational 
involved 28 housing units.51 Non-profits usually do not have the 
capital or the expertise to build more than a few units at a time. 
Moreover, one has to suspect the self-serving nature of this sugges­
tion, given that towns have fought efforts by non-profits to build 
affordable housing just as hard as they have fought for-profit 
developments. 
On the other hand, housing of any type is not going to be built 
no matter how good the planning has been unless a builder steps 
forward to do the building. That person or entity, profit or non­
profit, will not step forward unless the project makes good market 
49. Michael Wheeler, Regional Consensus on Affordable Housing: Yes in My 
Backyard?, 12 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 139 (1993) (This quote is found on page 4 of the 
1992 unpublished version, on file with author). 
50. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council, 735 A.2d 231 
(Conn. 1999); W. Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council (West Hartford), 
636 A.2d 1342 (Conn. 1994). 
51. The four other appeals considered by the appellate and supreme courts were 
brought by for-profit developers and in comparison they proposed building a total of 
225 units. See Rappa, supra note 22, at attachment 3. 
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sense (including available subsidies such as' government grants, 
market or below market interest rates, tax credits, etc.). The 
builder initiates the affordable housing project, but the planning 
and zoning commission can only veto it. By avoiding the establish­
ment of needs and quotas, the Blue Ribbon Commission in effect 
assumed that the need for affordable housing existed generally 
throughout the state, and whoever would satisfy any part of that 
need was serving the reasons for the adoption of the Act in the first 
place. Conversely, no town was going to be required to provide 
affordable housing if there was no need for it because a builder 
would not be asking to build there in the first place. 
The statute seemed like an elegant solution in a second or 
third-best world. The Act permitted towns to continue following 
their own home rule preferences except in a limited number of situ­
ations involving affordable housing. In those cases the Appeals Act 
substituted free market values and concepts for government regula­
tion-an approach widely in vogue in the eighties and nineties, and 
one presumably favored by the largely conservative towns that en­
ded up being most opposed to the Appeals Act. We would like to 
have done more for affordable housing, but the political realities as 
we saw them precluded this. Unfortunately, time has proven our 
fears about the strength of the opposition to affordable housing 
well-founded. 
II. PLANNERS' OBJECTIONS TO SECTION 8-30g 
Section 8-30g has been a political lightning rod since its adop­
tion. Every year efforts have been made to repeal or modify it, 
some of which have succeeded. Potentially the most significant 
amendment precluded the use of industrially zoned land for afford­
able housing which was not governmentally assisted.52 Other 
amendments ratcheted up the number of units that had to be af­
fordable in order for the development to qualify for the protection 
of section 8-30g from the original 20% to 25%,53 required that a 
unit qualifying as affordable remain so for 30 years,54 and required 
that a portion of affordable units be available to persons earning no 
more than 60% of the lesser of the area's or state's median 
52. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(c)(2)(A) (1999). 
53. § 8-30g(a)(1)(B). 
54. Id. The original legislation did not establish a minimum period of time during 
which an eligible unit needed to remain affordable. 
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Apart from the expected political objections to the Appeals 
Act that are based on a misunderstanding of the home rule law in 
Connecticut,56 the primary objection to the Appeals Act is that it 
gives the applicant an opportunity to force municipalities to accept 
land use proposals that violate good planning principles because the 
applicant can win an appeal regardless of the merit of its proposal. 
Put more trenchantly, an applicant can "blackmail" a town into ac­
cepting its development proposal, even if it is not one for affordable 
housing, by threatening to withdraw the objectionable application 
and resubmit an affordable housing application. The assumptions 
behind this allegation are that the affordable housing use of the site 
would be more offensive to the town than would be the use pro­
posed, and that the town would lose an appeal of its denial of the 
affordable housing application. 
This is a charge more easily made than verified. The most of­
fensive scenario is that just described, where a developer submits a 
proposal that the town wants to reject for sound planning reasons. 
However, any expressed objection to the proposal by the commis­
sion is met by the developer's threat to reapply with an affordable 
housing component as a new part of the original proposal. The 
town will not be able to deny the "new" proposal because it will 
lose a developer's appeal brought under the Appeals Act. 
I had student research assistants conduct a survey of town 
planners for the thirteen towns in the New Haven regional planning 
area to determine how extensive the blackmail was thought to be. 
Several planners said this had happened in their town, but only one 
planner was able to give particulars. In that case, the planner said 
that although the threat was made, the town denied the objection­
able application anyway and the developer then disappeared with­
out following through on its threat. The town planner for 
Wallingford said that no threats had ever been made in her town 
because developers always knew they would get a straight deal 
from the commission. In addition, I examined the reported section 
8-30g decisions between 1990 and 1996, and I could discern a poten­
tial for "blackmail" in the facts of only four of the fifty or so cases 
55. § 8-30g. Formerly there was no requirement such as this. 
56. See generally Simons v. Canty, 488 A.2d 1267, 1270-71 (Conn. 1985) (discuss­
ing the home rule law); Timothy S. Hollister, The Myth and Reality of Home Rule Pow­
ers in Connecticut, 59 CONN. B.l. 389 (1985) (same); Neil O. Littlefield, Municipal 
Home Rule - Connecticut's Mature Approach, 37 CONN. B.l. 390 (1963) (same). 
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litigated throughout the state during those six years.57 In two of the 
cases it appears that the developer's threat had been followed 
through via a resubmitted application that now included an afforda­
ble housing component.58 In a third instance, a bank had been una­
ble to sell industrially zoned land it had foreclosed on and applied 
for subdivision approval of a project which included an affordable 
housing element (this was before the 1995 amendments prohibiting 
the use of industrially zoned land for affordable housing). The 
town escaped the threat, however, by finding a purchaser who 
agreed to establish an industrial use on the site.59 The fourth in­
stance of the use of an affordable housing component to leverage 
an objectionable project through a commission occurred in Ston­
ington, where an applicant proposed to build, in Stonington's old 
historic district, a very upscale "dockominium," which included the 
required minimum number of affordable housing units to qualify 
for a section 8-30g appeal. The project was widely opposed in town, 
and the commission rejected it. The developer appealed under sec­
tion 8-30g but lost the appeal because the court found, among other 
reasons, that the protection of the town's historic character and 
valid health and safety issues warranted the commission's denial of 
the application.60 
In the first three of these instances, the offensive use of section 
8-30g as a threat could have been avoided by prohibiting, within a 
moderately long period of time such as three years, a reapplication 
which included a newly added affordable housing component. Such 
a statutory amendment would not have prevented a developer's use 
of the Appeals Act as a threat, as was attempted in Stonington, so 
57. See generally Peter J. Vodola, Connecticut's Affordable Housing Appeals Pro­
cedure Law in Practice, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1235, 1240-45 (1997). Vodola's article pro­
vides an enormous amount of data on the first six years of the Act, including a wealth of 
comments by planners, public officials, and developers on the Act's implementation. 
Vodola is more sympathetic to the problems of public officials attempting to implement 
the Act than I am, and he does not share my concern that the zoning system in Con­
necticut is tilted against the developer. Yet while he quotes many officials' and plan­
ners' complaints about developer "blackmail," we do agree that there is little actual 
evidence of developer abuse of the Act. Id. at 1245-62. 
58. See Young v. Tolland Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 950555015, 1997 
WL 535252, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 15,1997); Ensign-Bickford v. Simsbury Zon­
ing Comm'n, No. CV 940544054S, 1996 WL 737495, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 
1996). 
59. Dime Sav. Bank v. Durham Planning & Zoning Comm'n, Nos. CV 94­
0536676, CV 94-0536677, 1995 WL 548755, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 1995); see 
Rappa, supra note 22, at attachment 2. 
60. United Progress, Inc. v. Stonington Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 92­
05133925, 1994 WL 76803, at *19 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1994). 
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that the Appeals Act still could be used for arguably improper pur­
poses. But is that true? The Appeals Act was designed to produce 
more affordable housing than was being provided by the free mar­
ket (defined to include the standard land use controls) but was 
never. designed to produce developments that always included a 
high percentage of affordable units. The Stonington project would 
have produced more affordable housing than otherwise would have 
existed in Stonington. If the proposed dockominium otherwise sat­
isfied the town's development and zoning plans, the inclusion of 
unwanted affordable' housing should not be the basis for rejecting 
the proposal. 
Another problem with the blackmail scenario is that it seems 
to be more apparent than real. If blackmail were as common as 
towns often assert, we should not have the surprising result docu­
mented in Hollister's study-that three-quarters of the affordable 
housing units built pursuant to section 8-30g litigation were built in 
projects that were 100% affordable and that these projects consti­
tuted one-half of the affordable housing developments approved af­
ter litigation.61 Yet the statute allows a developer to take 
advantage of section 8-30g if a mere 20% (now 30%) of the units in 
the project are affordable. Assuming affordable housing units have 
a lower profit margin than do m<\rket rate units, one would think 
that developers .interested in the higher profits assumed by the 
blackmail argument would keep the number of affordable housing 
units down to the minimum necessary to gain the protection of the 
Appeals Act. "Blackmail," in other words, may not be as common 
as is usually alleged .. 
Nevertheless, some town planners have made overwrought 
comments about the Appeals Act's destruction of sound town plan­
ning. The town planner for Trumbull, for example, proclaimed that 
when an affordable housing application comes in, the town is 
obliged to approve it, and "[w]e've lost all control over zoning."62 
Another town planner opined that the law elevated affordable 
housing over proper land use planning.63 A third town planner 
concluded that the Appeals Act "says that if you want to call it 
affordable housing, you can get away with anything you can."64 
61. See Rappa, supra note 22, at attachment 3. 
62. Vodola, supra note 57, at 1265 (quoting Joan Gruce, the Planning and Zoning 
Administrator for the town of Trumbull, Connecticut). 
63. Id. (quoting Robert Nerny, the Town Planner in Southington). 
64. Id. at 1264 (quoting William Kweder, Planning Consultant for the town of 
Suffield). 
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These statements reflect a refusal to look at the facts. As of 1995, 
the Connecticut courts had upheld municipal. rejections of afforda­
ble housing applications in 50% of the cases brought under the Ap­
peals Act.65 More importantly, these planners' criticisms (and 
other planners shared their views66) strongly suggest a willful mis­
reading of the statute as well. The Appeals Act does not prevent a 
town from continuing to control the uses of land in the town. 
Rather, it merely requires a town to identify sound planning con­
cerns as the reasons for rejecting an affordable housing application, 
and it precludes rejections for reasons that have no basis in public 
health or safety. 
Overall, the courts have responsibly sought to separate the spe­
cious from real and important municipal interests. By turning the 
initiative over to the builder, we did not eliminate consideration of 
planning principles or concerns. We merely sought to force towns 
to articulate good planning reasons for rejecting an application 
which, by its nature, involved social issues of great public 
importance. 
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ACT 
One measure of the impact of section 8~30g is to count the 
number of affordable housing units that have been added to the 
housing inventory as a result of the adoption of the Appeals Act. 
In 1996-1997, Timothy Hollister, an attorney active in affordable 
housing development and litigation, organized a group of thirteen 
developers and attorneys familiar with affordable housing in Con­
necticut. Their objective was to compile a list of affordable housing 
units that had been given local land use approval between 1990 and 
1996, whether through negotiation with a town or pursuant to a 
court decision after section 8-30g litigation.67 At a minimum, his 
65. The 50% number includes cases in which one of the parties prevailed on pro­
cedural grounds. 
66. See Vodola, supra note 57 (providing reports of his extensive interviews with 
Connecticut municipal planners). Vodola's interviews found very few planners who 
would openly defend the Appeals Act. I have discussed elsewhere some of the implica­
tions of the antipathy to the Appeals Act by many planners. See Terry J. Tondro, Frag­
ments of Regionalism: State and Regional Planning at Century's End, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. 
REV. 1123, 1140-58 (1999). 
67. Rappa, supra note 22, at attachment 3. Hollister has since updated through 
1993 the list of decided cases which was part of his 1996 report. TImothy S. Hollister, 
Connecticut's Affordable Housing Appeals Statute (Jan. 14, 1999) (unpublished presen­
tation to Stamford Regional Bar Association) (on file with author). Hollister was a 
member of the Second Blue Ribbon Commission discussed infra Part VI. The author 
of this Article was one of the participants in Hollister's group. 
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study concluded that 1627 affordable housing units had been built 
in that period, 1041 without resort to the Appeals Act or by local 
negotiation and settlement, and 586 as a result of litigation. In com­
parison, about 57,000 building permits were issued statewide in the 
same period.68 In other words, 3% of the housing units authorized 
for construction in the seven year period were affordable housing 
units for which section 8-30g was directly responsible. 
This does not sound like a lot. By comparison, Massachusetts 
claims to have influenced the construction of over 20,000 affordable 
housing units over a 30-year period. That is about 5000 units every 
7 years, compared to the 1600 units we have developed in a 7-year 
period. Connecticut is a smaller state with presumably fewer build­
ing permits issued per year than in Massachusetts, which would ex­
plain part of the difference between the two states. Moreover, the 
7-year period during which the Connecticut Appeals Act has been 
in place coincided almost precisely with a significant real estate 
market depression in Connecticut, whereas Massachusetts' statistics 
include the boom years from 1970-1989. The building downturn be­
gan just about the day section 8-30g was enacted and only began to 
reverse in 1995. 
As Hollister himself observed, one problem with the survey is 
that members of the participating group often had difficulty identi­
fying a townsperson with knowledge of what was happening in the 
town over the 7-year period covered by the survey. Furthermore, 
they could not be sure whether a negotiated settlement occurred as 
a result of the background pressure exerted by the existence of sec­
tion 8-30g or simply sound land use regulation. 
Our primary hope for the Appeals Act was not so much that it 
would cause homes to be built under court orders, which would be 
easier to obtain than zoning approvals from town commissions, but 
that it would persuade towns to more fairly appraise proposals for 
affordable housing and to negotiate the specifics of the affordable 
housing proposal. To evaluate whether this happened, the success 
of the statute needs to be measured by other data, beyond simply 
tabulating the number of affordable housing units developed as a 
result of court order. One of those measures is whether commis­
sions in fact dealt more fairly with affordable housing applications 
after the statute was adopted. This is quite difficult to measure, of 
course, as it requires reviewing the actual proceedings of commis­
sion evaluations of affordable housing applications as well as the 
68. See Hollister, supra note 67. 
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proceedings involving non-affordable housing applications during 
the same period. Hollister's study suggested that about two-thirds 
of the affordable housing built in his six year study period resulted 
from negotiations rather than litigation.69 This information has to 
be considered very "soft," however, since negotiations on such a 
politically sensitive topic as affordable housing are bound to be 
kept quiet. Identifying affordable housing units built as a result of 
the potential threat of section 8-30g litigation will depend on indi­
vidual recollections and beliefs (and probably the interviewees' po­
litical agenda). 
In my study of the Act's effects in the New Haven regional 
planning area during its first 7 years (1990-1996),70 I attempted to 
use a more focused methodology, examining the minutes and other 
records of the decisions on all land use applications in the region's 
15 towns. Three student researchers examined the planning and 
zoning commission regulations and files on proposed market rate 
and affordable housing developments. Also examined were the 
minutes of commission meetings and public hearings on these pro­
posals in the 13 towns in the New Haven regional planning region 
that were not exempted from the reach of the Appeals Act. Based 
on their information, we found that 89 units of affordable housing 
had been built or were under construction in the region. However, 
a much larger number of affordable housing units, 225, mayor may 
not be counted as affordable housing, depending on one's evalua­
tion of the details of those projects. In other words, the information 
was not particularly helpful. Some of the problems confronted 
were that the records varied widely from town to town so that 
meaningful inter-town comparisons were impossible; some towns 
did not even keep meeting minutes (neither by stenographer nor 
even on tape, although required by Connecticut law),71 Therefore, 
information on what was said was impossible to obtain and ulti­
mately each project, affordable or market-rate, was unique. Those 
differentiating factors often can persuasively explain whatever dif­
ference in treatment one might be able to identify. 
Another measure of the Appeals Act's success might be 
gleaned from an analysis of the amendments made by a town to its 
zoning regulations to facilitate lower-cost housing opportunities. 
Hollister's group identified 51 of Connecticut's 169 towns that dur­
69. See Hollister, supra note 67. 
70. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of "blackmail." 
71. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-7a (1999). 
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ing the study period had amended their zoning regulations to im­
prove housing afford ability, but his report does not identify the 
changes made. Seeking more detail, I had a student ask the re­
gional planner at each of the Connecticut Regional Planning Agen­
cies about changes in the regulations of the towns in their regions. 
He obtained information on 45 towns which had changed their reg­
ulations in such a manner that conceivably more affordable housing 
could be built. Given that more or less 30 towns are exempt from 
the reach of the affordable housing statute in any particular year, 
about 139 towns (rather than 169) is the relevant base for this pur­
pose. Therefore, we know that just about one-third of the munici­
palities subject to section 8-30g appeals did amend their local 
zoning regulations. The respondents' information was not always 
complete however, and in addition, the question of which regula­
tion changes qualify as promoting affordable housing is not clear. 
Quite a few changes were made, most of them rather minor, and all 
of them subject to the caveat that while changing the regulations is 
promising, if no one takes advantage of the change (for whatever 
reason) the change might just as well have not been made. 
For example, the most common change was to establish an af­
fordable housing district or overlay zone in which a housing unit 
bonus was provided if affordable housing units were included in the 
development. Fifteen of the towns for which we obtained informa­
tion adopted a new multi-family zone with the affordable housing 
bonus, and others were considering doing so when this survey was 
made. This sounds good, but the true value of the change depends 
on its context. One town's regulation was subsequently held inap­
plicable to a proposed affordable housing project because those 
regulations also mandated a higher percentage of affordable hous­
ing units than the 20% then required to qualify under section 8-30g. 
The court's concern seemed to have been that by requiring more 
than 20% of the units to be affordable the town was attempting to 
increase the amount of cross-subsidies that had to be provided by 
the lowered number of market rate units, thereby making the de­
velopment less economically viable.72 The other common change, 
72. See Nat'l Associated Props. v. N. Branford Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. 
CV92 0518954 S, 1993 WL 489486 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 1993), affd, 658 A.2d 114 
(1995); Shapiro Farm Ltd. P'ship v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n (N. Branford), No. CV 
92-0517281 S, 1993 WL 452234 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1993). A cross-subsidy occurs 
where the shortfall between the costs of operating a unit and the rents received from a 
subsidized (presumably affordable) unit is made up by slightly increasing the rent 
charged for an unsubsidized unit in the same development to a level above that which 
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adopted by 9 of the 45 towns, was to allow accessory apartments. 
While an accessory apartment is undoubtedly more affordable than 
a single-family home, so that general progress toward reducing 
housing costs was made by these towns, the rent for an accessory 
apartment is, nonetheless, not necessarily within the affordable 
housing price range. Another cautious change in 2 towns was to 
provide a density bonus for elderly housing units, if the elderly units 
were affordable. 
Many changes authorized a waiver of certain zoning regula­
tions if the proposed development included affordable housing, 
such as the waiver of a zoning requirement that non-conforming 
lots must be merged; waiver of front footage rules to permit the 
creation of flag lots (which allow the owner of a large lot to subdi­
vide off the rear portion of the lot even though sufficient lot front­
age for two lots on a street would not then exist; access to the rear 
lot is provided by a long driveway-the flagpole); waiver of ground 
floor residential use requirements; waiver of maximum lot coverage 
standards; and the waiver of minimum floor area requirements to 
allow building of "starter homes." One central city negotiated 
agreements with its suburbs whereby a suburb undertook to "work 
with" its landlords to gain their acceptance of section 8 certificate 
holders. Another town created a trust fund to make affordable 
housing grants to eligible persons and to build affordable housing 
projects, and yet another town approved owner-occupied duplexes 
if one of the units was affordable. 
IV. THE CAPITOL REGION's HOUSING COMPACT ApPROACH 
In the same year as the first Commission was appointed, the 
Connecticut legislature created an alternate mechanism for encour­
aging the development of affordable housing. The legislation 
funded a pilot program in the Hartford Regional Planning area to 
see if, with the help of a professional negotiator, the participating 
towns could agree on a strategy for increasing the low-income hous­
would be required to pay for that unit's costs. See generally ALAN MALLACH, INCLU­
SIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1984). 
Compare a subsequent superior court holding that a town could not limit the num­
ber of affordable housing units to 50% of the development because the need for afford­
able housing outweighed the commission's reasons for limiting the number of 
affordable housing units. Simply from a planning perspective, I would think that limit­
ing the percentage of affordable housing in a development is a good thing to do in order 
to prevent the creation of affordable housing "ghettoes." Griswold Hills Newington 
Ltd. P'ship v. Newington Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 45, 48-49 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1996). 
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ing supply in the region.73 A 5 year Capitol Region Fair Housing 
Compact on Affordable Housing ("Compact") was adopted by 25 
of the 29 towns in the region, effective on May 23, 1990. 
The Compact established a goal of creating between 4583 and 
5637 new affordable housing opportunities in the region over the 
five years of the plan. Housing opportunities included the construc­
tion of new housing units, but also included new initiatives to facili­
tate the creation of more affordable housing opportunities such as 
the preparation of an affordable housing strategy. The 5 year sum­
mary report for the Compact, for example, gave the town of Glas­
tonbury credit for 3 initiatives; (1) adopting new zoning regulations 
to allow accessory apartments; (2) establishing a Housing Partner­
ship (a program designed to partner the state with the town to find 
resources for affordable housing, a recommendation of the first 
Commission); and (3) establishing an Affordable Housing Land 
Trust.74 Glastonbury's strategy for meeting its Compact goal was to 
permit the production of moderately-priced units through its ex­
isting Planned Area Development regulations, "and to pursue other 
initiatives as appropriate." In terms of new housing unit construc­
tion, Glastonbury received credit for adding 45 elderly affordable 
units and 48 family affordable units, for a total of 93 new units as of 
September 1995.75 Glastonbury fell into the group of 5 towns that 
had achieved between 50% and 74% of minimum Compact goals 
while 16 towns achieved more than had this group. Five municipali­
ties participating in the Compact achieved less.76 
At the end of the 5 year Compact, the towns assessed their 
next step, and voted to replace the Compact's techniques of specific 
goals with a Regional Housing Policy which was also to remain in 
effect for a 5 year period. The major difference between the Com­
pact goal-type structure, and the Housing Policy structure, is how 
non-directive the Policy is. Of 11 strategies for accomplishing its 
goal of increasing "the range of choice in housing," only 1 discusses 
a land use policy for each town that will "allow for a diversity of 
housing types and costs in all communities. "77 The other ten strate­
gies speak about transportation, job creation, use of federal and 
73. 1988 Conn. Acts 334 (Reg. Sess.). 
74. Capitol Region Fair Housing Compact Annual Report 23-24 (Sept. 1995) (un­
published report) (on file with author) [hereinafter Capitol Report]. 
75. /d. at app. A-3 to A-5. 
76. Id. at 4-5. 
77. Capitol Region Council of Governments Regional Housing Policy Executive 
Summary 2 (Jan. 28, 1998) (unpublished report) (on file with author). 
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state housing subsidies, helping families move from subsidized 
housing to non-subsidized housing, etc,78 Nothing, in other words, 
looks remotely like a call to towns to drop their existing barriers to 
newcomers from out of town. This is a Home Rule document. 
But the Christian Activities Council, Congregational decision, 
discussed in the next section, found that Glastonbury's participation 
in the Compact was a positive action indicating that the town was 
not closed. Glastonbury had nearly met its compact quota for the 
creation of additional affordable housing units in the town despite 
its denial of the application at issue in that case. 
V. THE CHRISTIAN ACTIVITIES DECISION 
The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld section 8-30g in the 
first two appeals it heard under the Act. In West Hartford Interfaith 
Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council (West Hartford), the court held the 
Act applied to any affordable housing decision by a zoning author­
ity, despite an ambiguity in the statute about whether a rejection of 
an application for a zone change (as opposed to a more limited de­
cision on the approval of a particular development project) could 
be appealed and the burden shifted to the town to justify its deci­
sion.79 To decide otherwise, the court held, would give a town an 
easy way of avoiding the statute, by zoning all land so that a zone 
change would be required before sUbmitting an individual site ap­
plication. A second important holding was that a zoning commis­
sion can impose and enforce conditions on all types of development 
approvals, clarifying a confused area of Connecticut law.8o 
In Kaufman, decided the next year, the court again sustained 
an appeal by an applicant because the reason given by the Town of 
Danbury for rejecting an application (a town water supply might 
become polluted) was contradicted by evidence produced before 
the commission by the town's own engineer.81 The court held that 
the "sufficient evidence" standard required by the statute was not 
as demanding as the usual "substantial evidence" required to sup­
port an administrative decision on an application concerning a spe­
cific site. Nonetheless, it required more than a "possibility" that the 
feared result would occur. Kaufman relied on legislative history for 
78. Id. at 1-3. 
79. w. Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council (West Hartford), 636 
A.2d 1342, 1354-55 (Conn. 1994). 
80. Id. at 1355. 
81. Kaufman v. Zoning Comm'n (Danbury), 635 A.2d 798, 819 (Conn. 1995). 
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this conclusion. The House Manager for the legislation had ob­
served that "sufficient evioence" would require "something on the 
record that third parties can look at in an objective manner and 
reach the same conclusion."82 Kaufman also spoke to the condi­
tioning power of zoning commissions when the court dismissed 
Danbury's complaint that it had no means of enforcing resale and 
other restrictions on affordable housing parcels. Kaufman reiter­
ated the rule established in West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc., 
that commissions can condition zoning approvals and specifically 
held that a commission can even place enforceable conditions on 
zone change approvals.83 
However, in its third Appeals Act decision, in 1999, Christian 
Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council (Glastonbury), 
the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected a developer's appeal from 
the denial by the Glastonbury Town Council of a zone change ap­
plication.84 The application would allow the construction of 26 sin­
gle-family affordable houses on a 33-acre parcel owned by the 
Metropolitan District Commission ("MDC"), a regional water au­
thority in the Hartford area. The MDC also owned 546 acres of 
land directly across a street from the 33-acre site. All of the MDC's 
land was zoned as "reserved land," meaning that no residential de­
velopment was allowed.85 The applicant had applied for a zone 
change for the smaller site to enable construction of the affordable 
housing "for low.and moderate income minority families."86 The 
Glastonbury Town Council exercises zoning powers in Glastonbury, 
but only after receiving the recommendation of the Town Planning 
and Zoning Commission. In Christian Activities Council, Congrega­
tional, the Commission had recommended approval of the 
application.87 
The Town Council gave several reasons for its denial of the 
application, including that a dangerous traffic intersection existed 
on the road bisecting the two MDC parcels; the 1994 Plan of Devel­
opment had recommended that the town consider purchasing the 
MDC lands for open space; and its concern that the construction 
82. Remarks of Representative Tulisano at the House Proceedings on May 30, 
1989, in response to question by an opponent of the proposed legislation. Http:// 
www.cga.state.ct.us/textsearch/sessiontranscripts. 
83. Kaufman, 653 A.2d at 811-12. See generally TONDRO, supra note 25, at 463. 
84. 735 A.2d 231, 236 (Conn. 1999). This author co-authored an amicus brief in 
this case, urging a reversal of the trial court's decision. 
85. Id. at 236. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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would endanger a potential future water supply source.88 The trial 
court held that Glastonbury had carried its burden of proof on the 
third reason (endangering the public water supply),89 but the Con­
necticut Supreme Court concluded that the town's open space pro­
tection defense was stronger.90 Neither court discussed the two 
reasons each court did not consider, following the traditional Con­
necticut zoning rule that a town's decision must be upheld even if 
only one of the reasons for the decision is supported by evidence in 
the record.91 
The positive aspect of the decision in Christian Activities Coun­
cil, Congregational is its clear support for the Blue Ribbon Com­
mission's effort to effectively require a zoning commission to 
provide an affordable housing applicant with the reasons for the 
commission's rejection. Despite a statutory requirement that most 
land use regulatory agencies, including planning and zoning com­
missions, state the reasons for their decisions, the Connecticut 
courts have consistently refused to penalize a commission for failing 
to do SO.92 If a commission fails to provide the reasons for its deci­
sion, the trial and appellate courts are obliged to search the record 
to determine if any basis exists for upholding the commission. Even 
if every reason the commission gives for its decision is illegal, the 
courts must still search the record, and if they find a proper reason 
the decision must be upheld.93 This misreading of the statute com­
pounds the difficult task of an applicant (or neighbor) seeking to 
reverse a municipal decision, since the appellant cannot know the 
grounds on which the decision might be attacked, and the courts 
themselves have difficulty in reviewing commission decisions-es­
88. Id. at 237. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 248-53. 
91. See TONDRo, supra note 25, at 406 n.65. 
92. See id., at 474-75, n.295 for citations to the statutes requiring a statement of 
reasons when reviewing zone changes, historic district commission denials, variances, 
special permits, appeals from decisions by the zoning enforcement officer, waivers of 
subdivision regulations, applications for approval of subdivisions and re-subdivisions, 
and of coastal site plans. 
93. Stankiewicz v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals (Montville), 556 A.2d 1024 (Conn. 
1989) (per curiam), affg 546 A.2d 919, 920-21 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (establishing the 
most extreme form of the no-reasons rule); see also, e.g., Protect HamdenlN. Haven 
From Excessive Traffic and Pollution, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n (Hamden), 
600 A.2d 757, 766-68 (Conn. 1991); Caserta v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals (Milford), 610 
A.2d 713, 715-16 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992), appeal decided on other grounds, 626 A.2d 744 
(Conn. 1993). The extent of a court's obligation is a bit muddled, however, after West 
Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc., which reiterated the pre-Stankiewicz rule and pro­
vided citations to cases with conflicting holdings. See TONDRo, supra note 25, at 475. 
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pecially in the politically and emotionally charged area of exclu­
sionary zoning.94 The court in Christian Activities Council, 
Congregational explicitly found that the Act required the commis­
sion "to state its reasons on the record when it denies an affordable 
housing land use application ... because it will help guard against 
possibly pretextual denials of such applications. "95 But beyond the 
statement-of-reasons holding, Christian Activities Council, Congre­
gational contains one narrow and cramped decision after another 
against the purpose of the Appeals Act, even though the Court had 
held that the Appeals Act was a remedial act to be liberally con­
strued to "facilitate the much needed development of affordable 
housing throughout the state. "96 
On the other hand, an even more important holding of the case 
limited the area for the determination of the need (or demand) for 
affordable housing to the town in which the site is located. The 
court relied on the legislative history of the statute and the floor 
debates to reach this conclusion. The Blue Ribbon Commission had 
suggested that affordable housing needs be measured by the hous­
ing need of the region as determined by the state's regional plan­
ning agencies,97 or by such other method as established by the 
Office of Policy and Management.98 Statutory precedent for a re­
gional approach to calculating housing needs already required 
towns, when adopting zoning regulations, to "encourage the devel­
opment of housing opportunities ... for all residents of the munici­
pality and the planning region in which the municipality is 
located. "99 Furthermore, Connecticut General Statutes section 8­
94. Connecticut courts have recognized the problem even in cases not involving 
exclusionary zoning allegations. See, e.g., Parks v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n (South­
ington), 425 A.2d 100, 103 (Conn. 1979); Daughters of St. Paul, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. 
(Trumbull), 549 A.2d 1076, 1084 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988). See generally Carol M. Rose, 
Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 
CAL. L. REV. 837 (1983) (providing a thoughtful discussion of jurisprudential reasons 
why an administrative agency should provide reasons for its decisions). 
95. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council (Glastonbury), 
735 A.2d 231, 239 (Conn. 1999). 
96. Id. at 239 (quoting Kaufman v. Zoning Comm'n (Danbury), 653 A.2d 798, 809 
(Conn. 1995)); W. Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council (West Hartford), 
636 A.2d 1342, 1349 (Conn. 1994). 
97. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-31a to 8-37b (1999) (establishing the procedure 
through which local regional planning agencies are formed). The State's Office of Pol­
icy and Management has established fifteen municipal planning regions. Towns may 
elect to participate in the activities of the Regional Planning Agencies and nearly all 
have done so. 
98. BRC I, supra note 4, at A-7. 
99. § 8-2 (emphasis added) (Connecticut's zoning delegation statute). 
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39a already defined affordable housing as housing for people whose 
income is equal to or less than the "area median income for the 
municipality in which such housing is located." Hence the Blue 
Ribbon Commission's bill as submitted to the legislature had re­
quired a consideration of "the need for affordable housing in the 
region." However, the legislature omitted the italicized language 
from the bill in the process of adopting the legislation. loo The court 
noted that in an exchange between one of the bill's sponsors and 
one of its opponents, the sponsor was asked if dropping the regional 
language was the same as substituting a reference to "the town in 
question," to which he responded "I think that is generally the 
intent."101 
Both West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. and Kaufman had 
put off deciding the town/regional issue. In Kaufman the court 
avoided the issue by pointing out that its decision-that the town's 
reasons for rejecting the application were not supported by the evi­
dence-meant that the town's rejection could not be upheld regard­
less of whether need was measured in the town or in the region.102 
In West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc., the court avoided the 
issue by observing that much less than 10% of West Hartford's 
housing supply was affordable, so that defining the need for afford­
able housing by looking only at West Hartford's housing supply 
would not help the defendant town in any event.1°3 Moreover, the 
court held that "a local focus could severely undermine the devel­
opment of low income housing because wealthy towns could claim 
that they have few low income residents, and consequently have 
little or no local need for low income housing."104 This would be a 
particularly effective method for avoiding the application of section 
8-30g, given the intensity of the economic segregation of housing 
patterns in Connecticut. lOS 
This holding in West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. had im­
100. Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 249. 
101. !d. at 249-50 (citing Substitute House Bill 7270). 
102. Kaufman v. Zoning Comm'n, 635 A.2d 798, 819 (Conn. 1995). 
103. W. Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council (West Hartford), 636 
A.2d 1342, 1354 n.23 (Conn. 1994). West Hartford's percentage of affordable housing 
stock was 6% of its total housing stock, a little more than Glastonbury'S at the time the 
Christian Activities Council Congregational filed the application. 
104. Id. 
105. See RUSK, CmEs WITHOUT SUBURBS 114 (1995) (concluding that Connecti­
cut is the most economically segregated state in the United States, and the ninth most 
racially segregated state; Hartford, New Haven and Bridgeport, Connecticut's largest 
cities, are among the 21 poorest cities in the country). 
142 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:115 
plicitly set the court on the path of viewing any shortfall from the 
10% rule as establishing a need for affordable housing in that town. 
Since Glastonbury'S number of affordable housing units fell sub­
stantially below the 10% level, it was no more necessary for the 
court to decide the town-regional issue in Christian Activities Coun­
cil, Congregational than it had been in the prior two cases. None­
theless the court did decide the regional-local issue "because in the 
present case the defendant specifically phrased its reasons for deny­
ing the plaintiff's application in terms of 'the availability of other 
parcels in town suitable· for affordable housing.' "106 But no evi­
dence was presented that such sites even existed in Glastonbury. 
The record showed that the members of the Town Council "had 
relied on their knowledge that there were other sites in town that 
were suitable for affordable housing," yet there is no indication in 
either the trial court or Supreme Court opinions that the courts 
knew where these phantom sites were or whether they were in fact 
available for sale to an affordable housing developer.107 This un­
critical acceptance of the Town Council's unsupported assertion 
that other sites existed is contrary to holdings in and outside Con­
necticut in affordable housing cases that reject such unsupported 
claims. 
A variation on the "other available sites" claim was made by 
the township in Mount Laurel IIlO8 for example. In that case the 
New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the township's claim that other 
newly re-zoned land was available for affordable housing, noting 
that the township knew that the owners of the three parcels of land 
involved did not want to sell, that the sites were surrounded by in­
dustrial uses, and that parts or all of the three sites were described 
as swampy land.109 The Second Circuit in Huntington Branch, 
106. Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 249. 
107. Id. at 254. In Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, the Sec­
ond Circuit emphasized that the town's identical defense ("other sites are available") 
was flawed because 63 of the 64 alleged sites were in fact unavailable because they were 
under-developed properties - i.e., they required clearing of the site in order to build the 
proposed housing project - and the 64th site had been declared unsuitable by HUD. 
844 F.2d 926, 941 (2d Cir. 1988). In other words, the proposed alternate sites were 
identified and their zoning, development status, and appropriateness for affordable 
housing could be and were evaluated by the reviewing federal court. !d. That was not 
possible in Glastonbury, because the sites were never identified. Christian Activities 
Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 236-37. 
108. 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). 
109. !d. at 460-62. After its loss in Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713, the township 
had zoned three areas for higher density housing. Id. at 460. The plaintiffs in Mount 
Laurel II successfully contested the town's responses on several grounds, including the 
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NAACP v. Town of Huntington also refused to accept the town's 
argument that two alternate sites were available for the applicant's 
project because the town could not establish that the sites were in 
fact available to the affordable housing applicant.110 The lack of 
control over the sites meant that the town had not satisfied its obli­
gation to refute the prima facie case of discrimination that the ap­
plicant had made.lll The Connecticut Supreme Court itself had 
declined to accept the town's claim in West Hartford Interfaith Coa
lition, Inc. that other sites existed in town, in the absence of evi­
dence that those "other sites" met the statutory criteria of 
affordable housing.1l2 By now accepting the "other available sites" 
claim, particularly without requiring proof that such sites exist and 
are available, the court has presented towns with the perfect means 
for avoiding the force of section 8-30g: commission members simply 
have to assert that other (unspecified) sites are available, and that is 
the end of the appeal. 
The explanation for this odd result might be the Connecticut 
rule in land use cases that commission members are entitled to rely 
on their personal knowledge of the town and its situation when 
making a decision, unless the matter is one for which expert knowl­
edge is necessary (a pollution question, for instance) and in which 
expert testimony has been presented to support one side and not 
the other. ll3 After noting the Commission members' assertions 
about other sites, the court adds: "[m]oreover, the plaintiff makes 
no claim that there [were] no other sites in the town that are suita­
ble for affordable housing development."114 
The court thus subtly shifts back to the applicant the burden of 
proof (to support the "no other sites" claim that is now required) 
on the flimsiest of showings by the municipality: unsupported and 
unsworn claims by the defendant about the need for affordable 
housing in the town. In other words, the court has held that these 
phantom claims are sufficient to carry the town's burden of proof, 
or, the burden of proof has never really shifted despite the statute. 
Connecticut's judge-made rule allowing commissioners to rely on 
failure of the municipality to demonstrate that the re-zoned sites in fact were available. 
Id. at 460-62. 
110. 844 F.2d at 941. 
111. Id. at 938. 
112. W. Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council (West Hartford), 636 
A.2d 1342, 1352-53. 
113. Id. at 1352. 
114. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council (Glastonbury), 
735 A.2d, 231, 254. 
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their own knowledge unless an expert testifies to the contrary on a 
subject requiring expert opinion is good common sense ordinarily. 
But when its result, as here, is to severely weaken if not actually 
nUllify the primary technique adopted in a remedial statute, it 
seems the court should prefer the legislature's remedial course 
rather than blindly following the judge-made rule. The court had 
done just that in West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc., when it 
rejected the argument based on traditional zoning analysis that a 
zone change denial was not covered by the Act.lls West Hartford 
Interfaith Coalition, Inc. held that such a holding would destroy the 
remedial purpose of the statute by making it very easy to avoid, and 
accordingly declined to adopt that reasoning.116 Christian Activities 
Council, Congregational has now ensured that no affordable hous­
ing will be built in town unless the town wants it. That was the law 
in 1988 before section 8-30g was adopted as remedial legislation. 
Christian Activities Council, Congregational further under­
mined the court's earlier decisions on affordable housing need 
when it failed to explain why Glastonbury's less than 6% affordable 
housing stock percentage did not bear on that problem.117 Glaston­
bury has not had a stellar record of concern for providing afforda­
ble housing. In 1994, at the time the application was filed in 
Christian Activities Council, Congregational, only 5.48% of Glas­
tonbury'S housing stock was reported to be affordable. II8 Glaston­
bury was making progress toward the so-called 10% goal and 
continued to do so down to the release of the Christian Activities 
Council, Congregational decision, but the point under the West 
Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. and Kaufman cases was not 
whether Glastonbury was making progress, but, rather, whether it 
had reached the goal.119 It had not. 
115. 636 A.2d at 1348-49. 
116. Id. The traditional view had been adopted by an unappealed Superior Court 
case.. Lantos v. Newtown Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. 306607, 1992 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 651, at *6-9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1992). 
117. Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 254. 
118. State of Conn., Dep't of Hous., Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure (un­
published, Apr. 12, 1994). At the time the Connecticut Supreme Court released its 
opinion in Christian Activities Council, Congregational, Glastonbury's affordable hous­
ing stock was still only 6.79% of its total housing stock. State of Conn., Dep't of Econ. 
and Cmty. Dev., Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure (1998 files), at http:// 
www.state.ct.us/ecdlHousinglappeals.htm (last updated Oct. 30, 2000). The first De­
partment of Housing Report, July 9,1990, reported that 5.3% of Glastonbury's housing 
stock was affordable. 
119. At the time of its losing appeal, for example, Danbury's percentage of af­
fordable housing stock was 9.8%. The trial court rejected Danbury's argument that it 
2001] CONNECTICUT'S AFFORDABLE HOUSING APPEALS STATUTE 145 
Instead of focusing on Glastonbury's shortfall from the 10% 
established in the Act, the court focused on Glastonbury's satisfac­
tion of its obligations under the Capitol Region Housing Compact. 
It concluded that in 1993, a year before the plaintiffs applied for the 
zone change, Glastonbury had "met" 55% of its goal, "or 122 of its 
Compact goal of 220 affordable housing units."120 It is not clear 
where the court found these figures. The 1995 Annual Report of 
the Capitol Region's Fair Housing Compact stated that as of 1995 
Glastonbury had completed only 93 affordable housing units121­
but this was as of two years after the larger 1993 figures cited in 
Christian Activities Council, Congregational. The 93 units credited 
by the Compact's 1995 report are roughly consistent with the num­
bers cited in the Department of Housing's "10% list." Glaston­
bury's affordable housing supply in 1989 constituted 5.3% of its 
total housing supply and by 1994, that percentage had increased 
only to 5.48%, or, in absolute numbers, from 588 affordable hous­
ing units in 1989 to 650 affordable housing units at the end of 1994. 
There is a lot of uncertainty in the numbers, though, and the "dis­
crepancy," if there is one, would be unimportant but for the empha­
sis that the court places on Glastonbury's record of achievement 
under the terms of the Compact. 
By giving credit to Glastonbury's "good efforts" under the 
Compact, the court rewrote the statute to include a newly discov­
ered incentive for towns that are trying. Towns have correctly com­
plained that the only incentive (and a useless one at that) for towns 
to provide affordable housing was that even if a town made good 
faith efforts to satisfy a Compact objective it was protected from 
further section 8-30g appeals only for one year. Nonetheless, the 
statute does recognize that Housing Compacts existed but gave 
them only a limited ability to insulate the town from section 8-30g. 
Why does the court "correct" that statutory omission? 
As viewed by the court, then, the supply of affordable housing 
in Glastonbury is adequate, regardless of whether the statute's defi­
nitions are met. Instead, Christian Activities Council, Congrega­
tional relied on Glastonbury's activity under the Capitol Region 
Affordable Housing Compact as a measure of Glastonbury's efforts 
was only .2% short of having 10% of its housing stock credited as affordable and there­
fore should be considered exempt from the special appeals procedure for section 8-30g 
cases. Kaufman v. Zoning Comm'n, No. CV92 0507929S, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2039, at *25-29 (Aug. 13, 1993). 
120. Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 254. 
121. Capitol Report, supra note 74, at app. A-5. 
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to provide affordable housing rather than on its record as required 
under the Act.122 The court also observed that the town adopted a 
regulation allowing a density bonus for affordable housing within 
planned area development zones, although the court does not say 
whether that provision had ever been used,123 and noted that Glas­
tonbury had recently approved ten additional units of affordable 
housing.124 But the court failed to notice that Glastonbury on at 
least one occasion had gone out of its way to stop the building of 
affordable housing. In that instance, Glastonbury cited numerous 
reasons why it denied the application, including an over-concentra­
tion of affordable housing in the town center and loss of productive 
farm land. Nonetheless, the town lost. So serious was the town's 
intent to prevent affordable housing, that it responded by buying 
the land itself. 
That the town has an adequate supply of affordable housing is 
only one defense to a claim that it has violated the requirements of 
Section 8-30g. A second defense is that even though the demand 
for affordable housing is great, satisfaction of that need does not 
require the town to sacrifice other substantial public interests. The 
statute requires that the need for affordable housing be measured 
against any substantial public interest that would be threatened if 
the affordable housing proposal were approved. Protecting open 
space is clearly a substantial public interest, but the court does not 
clearly identify the open space it believed must be preserved. In 
Christian Activities Council, Congregational, out of a total MDC 
acreage of 579 contiguous acres, the affordable housing develop­
ment in question would use only 20 acres, leaving 559 acres of open 
space after development of the site.125 That this is inadequate open 
space is a bit preposterous, of course, but the court concludes that it 
is inadequate because the court chose to focus on the 33-acre por­
tion of the MDC site on one side of the road bisecting the MDC 
lands and ignored the contiguous 500+ acres on the other side of 
the road.126 The final sentence of the majority opinion insisted on 
viewing the 33-acre site as an island unto itself: "There was suffi­
122. Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 254. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. 735 A.2d 231. The specific site was 33 acres; the balance of the MDC-owned 
land, across the road from the site, was 546 acres, for a total of 579 acres of adjacent 
open space. The development would have used a cluster form, requiring only 20 acres 
of the 33 acres on the site, with the balance of 13 acres being dedicated as open space. 
Id. at 255. 
126. Id. 
2001] CONNECT/CUTS AFFORDABLE HOUSING APPEALS STATUTE 147 
cient evidence in the record for the defendant to have concluded 
that a 33.42 acre, twenty-eight unit residential subdivision, bisected 
by thirteen acres of open space, simply is not the same thing as 
33.42 acres of open space."127 Yet three pages earlier in the opin­
ion, the court held that all the MDC lands had to be considered as 
one entity "for purposes of open space and conservation. "128 
The relationship between the need for affordable housing and 
the protection of substantial public interests is the key to section 8­
30g and to providing for affordable housing in general. As noted 
above, the planners primarily objected to what they viewed as sec­
tion 8-30g's unwarranted authority to override what they consid­
ered to be proper planning decisions in favor of affordable housing 
objectives. But such a conflict is inevitable when the pursuit of 2 
desirable policy objectives produces conflicting results in specific 
contexts. A specific piece of land such as that in Glastonbury can­
not be used for both passive and active recreation, or for preserving 
historic structures in an historic district and the opening up of a new 
road. Nor can a 33-acre piece of land in Glastonbury be used both 
as open space and as a site for housing (for any income level). One 
of planning's objectives is to work out the conflicts between com­
peting choices for the allocation of scarce resources such as land. 
The choice made will be the product of criteria and priorities estab­
lished by statute and regulations, and by the decision-maker's judg­
ment about the application of those criteria and priorities in the 
particular context. But when the planning exercise is not thought to 
take adequate account of one of the competing policies, its propo­
nents have the option of looking for a political solution, as hap­
pened in 1969 in Connecticut when the legislature authorized the 
creation of inland wetlands agencies to protect wetlands from de­
struction.129 Environmentalists were concerned that local planning 
and zoning commissions were not adequately protecting wetlands 
from over-development although they had the authority to do so. 
As with section 8-30g, the legislature responded by taking the 
power to balance the competing policy interests out of the hands of 
planning and zoning commissions and gave it to the new inland wet­
lands agencies.130 
Section 8-30g does provide some criteria for deciding between 
127. Id. 
128. !d. at 253. 
129. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-36 to -45d (1999). 
130. §§ 22a-42 to -45d. 
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using a parcel for affordable housing, and using it to preserve a con­
flicting policy objective.131 A denial of an affordable housing appli­
cation must be "necessary" in order to protect a substantial public 
interest;132 even so, the need to protect that substantial public inter­
est must "clearly outweigh" the "need" for affordable housing if the 
denial is to be upheld.133 In order to sustain a town denial of an 
affordable housing application, then, this formula requires first, that 
the public interest be "substantial;"134 second, that it cannot be pro­
tected if the affordable housing application is granted;135 and third, 
that the affordable housing "need" is "clearly outweighed" by the 
necessity of protecting the identified public interest.136 
Protecting open space is clearly a substantial public interest, 
but the other two legs of the test do not seem satisfied in the Glas­
tonbury situation, contrary to the court's conclusion. While implic­
itly a balance is to be struck between the town's need for affordable 
housing and the protection of open space, that balance has been 
heavily weighted by the legislature in favor of affordable housing. 
The Appeals Act does not require a simple balancing of the need 
for affordable housing against the protection of sound planning 
concerns affecting public health and safety. Rather, it requires sat­
isfaction of the affordable housing need unless the necessity for 
protecting open space clearly outweighs137 the need for the afforda­
ble housing. A simple balancing of equal interests was not estab­
lished by the Appeals Act; rather, the legislation places a heavy 
thumb on the scale in favor of affordable housing. The public inter­
est is insufficient even if it outweighs the need for affordable hous­
ing; open space must "clearly outweigh" the affordable housing 
need. An affordable housing application may be rejected only if 
"necessary"-not simply reasonably necessary-to protect the pub­
lic interest. But unlike the court's close reading of the statutory 
language on other issues,138 the court chose not to emphasize these 
131. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(c). 
132. § 8-30g(c)(1)(B). 
133. § 8-30g(c)(1)(C). 
134. § 8-30g(c)(1)(B). 
135. § 8-30g(c)(1)(D). 
136. § 8-30g(c)(1)(C). 
137. Id. 
138. For example, the court placed great emphasis on the fact that the legislature 
had dropped the word "regional" as a qualifier when it described the "need" for afford­
able housing. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
legislative history of the word "region" in the statute. 
2001] CONNECTICUT'S AFFORDABLE HOUSING APPEALS STATUTE 149 

very high demands imposed on the town by the statute.139 
Applying the statutory balancing criteria, the question is did 
the preservation of 20 acres of land out of a total of 579 acres of 
open space clearly outweigh the affordable housing need in a con­
tiguous suburb of the second poorest city in the state, a suburb 
which has barely satisfied half of the legislative "goal" for afforda­
ble housing units? The court responded by characterizing the lost 
open space as the public interest that is threatened by transferring 
100% of the 33 acres to the plaintiff. This ignores, however, the 
more than 500 acres that were part of the original parcel, and which 
will continue to be preserved as open space. It also ignores the fact 
that even if the 33-acre parcel is viewed as an island unto itself 
more than 50% of that parcel would remain as open space because 
of the proposed cluster pattern of development. Open space at this 
site is thus rnischaracterized as a highly threatened resource. 
On the other side of the balance, the court's opinion eliminates 
any need for affordable housing in Glastonbury. It ignores (by im­
plicitly overruling) its earlier decisions in West Hartford Interfaith 
Coalition, Inc. and Kaufman on the circumstances when town or 
regional need is important and must be considered. It ignores its 
own conclusions in those cases and in Christian Activities Council, 
Congregational that the statute is to be interpreted to give it reme­
dial effect. It ignores Glastonbury's failure to comply with the 10% 
"goal" of section 8-30g. And finally, it "amends" the Appeals Act 
to protect a town from an affordable housing lawsuit because the 
town is complying with Compact requirements which section 8-30g 
itself rejects as irrelevant. 
Early in its opinion the court extensively discussed the mean­
ing of the "sufficient evidence" required by section 8-30g(c)(1)(A) 
if the town is to carry its newly imposed burden of proof. But this 
discussion seems of little consequence for the outcome of the case, 
as is evident upon examination of the evidence relied on by the 
court. The court accepted as sufficient evidence testimony that the 
town had been considering for over 25 years the purchase of the site 
in question for open space but had never gotten around to doing 
SO.140 Yet as stated in the court's opinion, it was only after the town 
139. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council (Glastonbury), 
735 A.2d 231, 244, 254 n.29. 
140. In 1971, the town unsuccessfully offered to purchase from MDC the 33-acre 
site in question. A year later, a town committee recommended that the town buy either 
the entire MDC land, or at least the 33-acre site. Nothing happened, evidently, as the 
Town Manager recommended in 1977 that the town purchase the 33 acre site, and again 
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received the affordable housing application of the developer to de­
velop 20 acres of the MDC land for affordable housing that the 
defendant Town Council ordered the commencement of the contin­
gency planning called for in the 10 year old 1984 Plan of 
Development.141 
The court examined this strangely coincidental timing of the 
town finally deciding to do something about the 25 year old unsatis­
fied recommendations of town officials, and the submission of the 
plaintiff's plans to build affordable housing on a small part of the 
tract. The Court concluded that: 
the defendant [Town Council] had before it a record replete with 
evidence that, consistently for nearly twenty-five years, beginning 
at the latest in April, 1971, and continuing to March, 1994, just a 
few months before the defendant's hearing in this case, the town 
had viewed the parcel in question, along with the rest of Metro­
politan [MDC] land, as particularly appropriate for open space 
... [and] that this was much more than an idle or passing thought 
for the town, which had planned for and on several occasions 
attempted to purchase the particular parcel in question for these 
purposes; or encouraged the state to do so as part of a regional 
plan.142 
The "several occasions" in fact total one instance of an offer to 
purchase, and one other instance when the town sought to persuade 
the state to purchase the land. 
Municipal decisions to purchase land are not lightly made, of 
course, so the town's delay in getting around to even studying how 
to acquire all or part of the MDC land is not surprising. What is 
bothersome, however, is that the town finally decided to act imme­
nothing was done. The same fate awaited the statement of policy in the 1984 Plan of 
Development that the town consider the purchase of all or part of the MDC land. It 
was not until after the plaintiff announced its plans for the 33-acre parcel that the Town 
Council ordered the contingency planning that had been called for ten years earlier. 
Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 251-53. 
141. The application by the Christian Activities Council, Congregational was sub­
mitted to the town on February 3, 1994; the Town Council finally ordered the long 
called for contingency planning "early in March 1994." Id. at 251. The Court summa­
rizes the efforts of the town to designate the land as public open space, or to acquire it. 
Id. at 251-53. Compare the Massachusetts Supreme Court's rejection of a town's at­
tempt to condemn land on which a developer had proposed to build affordable hous­
ing-the town claimed that the purpose of the condemnation was to provide parks and 
recreation facilities. Pheasant Ridge Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 1152, 
1156-58 (Mass. 1987). 
142. Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 253 (emphasis 
added). 
2001] CONNECTICUT'S AFFORDABLE HOUSING APPEALS STATUTE 151 
diately after it discovered the plaintiff was proposing to build af­
fordable housing on the small 33-acre parcel across the road from 
the 500+ acres that comprised the vast majority of MDC land. Lest 
some towns get the wrong idea about what seems to be another 
easy way to avoid the impact of section 8-30g,143 the court did em­
phasize the "long history" of the town's interest in the 33-acre site 
for open space, which "precludes any possible inference of pretext 
on the part of the town."144 Perhaps. The voters in North Haven 
might be struck by the ease with which Glastonbury was able to 
gain control over open space without paying a penny. North Ha­
ven, like Glastonbury, had also long marked a particular parcel to 
be used for open space and recreational purposes.145 The town 
board of selectmen voted to acquire or condemn the land only af­
ter a developer had applied for approval of an affordable housing 
project for the site.l46 Interestingly, North Haven had to pay just 
compensation for its condemnation of privately owned land to cre­
ate public open space.147 Glastonbury got its open space for free. 
Finally, Christian Activities Council, Congregational ignores 
the provision in Connecticut's zoning enabling statute which pro­
vides that: 
Such [zoning] regulations shall also encourage the development 
of housing opportunities, including opportunities for multifamily 
dwellings, consistent with soil types, terrain and infrastructure ca­
pacity, for all residents of the municipality and the planning re­
gion in which the municipality is located . . .. Such regulations 
shall also promote housing choice and economic diversity in 
housing, including housing for both low and moderate income 
households, and shall encourage the development of housing 
which will meet the housing needs identified in the housing plan 
prepared pursuant to section 8-37t and in the housing component 
and the other components of the state plan of conservation and 
143. See supra notes 111-12 and infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of ways of avoiding the force of section 8-30g .. 
144. Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 253. 
145. See Peter Rock Assocs. v. Town of North Haven, 756 A.2d 335, 338 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1998) (holding that the town owed the plaintiff the "fair market value per 
acre"), affd per curiam, 756 A.2d 290, 292 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000), cert. denied 761 A.2d 
754 (Conn. 2000). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 348. The Connecticut Supreme Court has recently accepted certiorari 
in another case where the town condemned land that was the subject of an affordable 
housing appeal. This case is Avalonbay Communities, Inc. v. Town of Orange, No. 
99065826, 2000 WL 226374 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 2000), and the Supreme Court 
docket number is 16352. 
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development prepared pursuant to section 16a-26.148 
The Court's decision in Christian Activities Council, Congregational 
ignored, if it did not actually nullify, that legislative mandate as 
well. 
The Act as thus interpreted is hardly the revolutionary dragon 
feared by some legislators when the statute was adopted 10 years 
ago, nor the statute that since its enactment has annually been the 
focus of major struggles for repeal or amendment. Nor is it a stat­
ute that was still so controversial in the spring of 1999 that the 
forces of repeal forced the supporters of the Appeals Act to agree 
to establish a new commission to examine its workings and to rec­
ommend necessary changes.149 
VI. 	 THE SECOND BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION REPORT AND THE 
LEGISLATURE's RESPONSE 
Supporters of affordable housing development in Connecticut 
put the best face on the Report of BRC II and the legislation that 
resulted,150 but it is clear that the Christian Activities Council, Con­
gregational decision has severely crippled the affordable housing ef­
fort in Connecticut, and that the year 2000 affordable housing 
amendments have redirected its course. The legislation increases 
the percentage of units that must be affordable in order for a devel­
opment to qualify as an affordable housing development protected 
by section 8-30g. In what the legislation now formally terms "set­
aside affordable housing developments" (those not receiving gov­
ernmental assistance), 30% of the units must be affordable, and 
they must remain affordable for 40 years.151 
148. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-2 (1999) (emphasis added). Research undertaken for 
the second Blue Ribbon Commission indicated that less than half of Connecticut's mu­
nicipalities have complied with this statutory mandate. BRC II, supra note 11, at 20. 
149. Senator Eric Coleman, a supporter of section 8-30g and co-chair of the sec­
ond Blue Ribbon Commission, said later that every year so much legislative time had to 
be devoted to debating the numerous proposed amendments to section 8-30g that not 
enough time remained to properly consider other housing legislation; normal legislative 
business was being "held hostage" to the revision or repeal of section 8-30g. Eric D. 
Coleman, Introductory Remarks at Understanding the Amendments to Connecticut's 
Affordable Housing Statute Conference, New Britain, Conn. (Sept. 8, 2000). 
150. See Connecticut Housing Coalition, Housing Highlights of the 2000 Legisla­
tive Session (n.d.) (on file with author). "The compromise forged by the Blue Ribbon 
Commission experienced some further compromise during the legislative process, but 
the final version was supported by the Coalition and other advocates, and adopted the 
final night of the session .... The House defeated an amendment to totally repeal the 
Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure by an encouragingly strong vote of 92-48." Id. 
151. Act effective Oct. 1, 2000, Pub. Act No. 00-206, 2000 Conn. Acts 962, 963 
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While assisted housing-housing which does receive govern­
mental financial assistance-can continue to use the section 8-30g 
procedure as before, under the new legislation private developers 
must rent or sell a higher percentage of their units at below market 
prices, meaning that the prices of the market rate units will have to 
go up to cover the increased internal subsidy required.152 The rhet­
oric of the proponents of this change is that it will increase the 
amount of truly affordable housing that is built. The contrary is 
more likely to be true, as for-profit developers-the key153 to pro­
viding affordable housing other than in a form akin to the much 
detested public housing-are less likely to participate. The 40-year 
requirement compounds the problem for the for-profit developer 
without a government subsidy; for example, planners assume the 
average life of a residential house is only 20 years. 
Two new forms are now required to take advantage of section 
8-30g. The affordable housing developer must submit an "Af­
ford ability Plan" and a "Conceptual Site Plan." The Affordability 
Plan is a new idea, and appears to be part of the new and broader 
view that the purpose of section 8-30g is to facilitate the provision 
of more very low-cost publicly supported housing. The Commis­
sioner of Economic and Community Development is to issue regu­
lations on Affordability Plans, which will include a formula on how 
to determine rent levels and sale prices, how to equate family size 
and maximum rental and sale prices for affordable housing, etc. 
The Affordability Plan must also include the designation of the per­
son or entity that will be responsible for ensuring that the income 
limits set by the statute are complied with over the 40 year period 
(if they are enforced by covenants in the deeds) as well as any other 
restrictions required by section 8-30g; the sequence in which the 
affordable and market rate units will be built in the case of a set­
aside project; and draft zoning regulations, covenants, deeds, and 
other documents intended to impose the income restrictions re­
quired by the Appeals ACt.154 
(Reg. Sess.) (amending § 8-30g) (substituting a new set of definitions in section 1). The 
new definition for "set-aside development" added the 30% and 40-year requirements to 
the necessary qualifications for use of the Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure. Id. 
152. See supra note 72 for a discussion of the cross-subsidy mechanism. 
153. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relative 
importance of for-profit and non-profit developers in bulding affordable housing. 
154. See 2000 Conn. Acts at 963 (providing the definition of an "Affordability 
Plan," under new section 8-30g(b)(1)(E), which requires submission of "draft zoning 
regulations, conditions of approvals, deeds, restrictive covenants or lease provisions 
that will govern affordable dwelling units"). 
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It is hard to evaluate the significance of the new statutory per­
mission for towns to require the submission of a Conceptual Site 
Plan as part of an application to change a zone to allow construc­
tion of affordable housing on a site. ISS Since 1977, section 8-30(g) 
of the Connecticut Statutes has authorized towns to require the 
submission of conceptual site plans to aid the commission in deter­
mining the conformity of any proposed building with the zoning 
regulations, so long as that requirement was stated in the town's 
regulations. Five years ago Kaufman v. Zoning Commission of 
Danbury specifically held that section 8-30(g) applies to zone 
change requests as well as to other zoning permit applications, if the 
requirement is in the town's regulations.1s6 Danbury's regulations 
. did not require such a submission so it could not rely on the appli­
cant's failure to submit a site plan as a justification for rejection of 
the developer's proposal. I S7 In any event, the section 8-30g amend­
ment adds explicit permission to require submission of a Concep­
tual Site Plan as part of a zoning amendment request if that 
application would permit the construction of affordable housing. 
The amendment is a recognition that for some time we in fact have 
used zone changes to regulate individual parcels contrary to funda­
mental zoning assumptions such as the uniformity rule. 
The new amendment to section 8-30g on site plans is confusing, 
however, because it does not at first glance appear to change the 
law at all. Both Kaufman and the amendment permit a zoning 
commission to require a site plan in connection with a request for a 
zone change, and both Kaufman and the amendment permit a com­
mission to impose that requirement only if that requirement is in 
the town's regulations. What is new is that the section 8-30g 
amendment limits what may be required in the site plan submitted 
with a zone change application to allow the building of an afforda­
ble housing project, whereas Kaufman did not place any restrictions 
on the information that could be required to be submitted as part of 
a site plan. 
The new amendment limits the information to be collected to 
"the proposed development's total number of residential units and 
155. New section 8-30g(c) authorizes commissions, if they wish, to require sub­
mission of Conceptual Site Plans of applicants for a zone change that would allow con­
struction of an affordable housing development. 
156. 653 A.2d 798, 805 ("[Z]oning commissions may require the submission of 
site plans for all zone change applications ....") (emphasis added). 
157. See id. (stating that the Commission conceded that the plaintiff's application 
was sufficient without site plans). 
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their arrangement on the property and the proposed development's 
roads and traffic circulation, sewage disposal and water supply."158 
These may be the core of a conceptual site plan, but site plans as 
used in Connecticut, and as authorized in Kaufman, have required 
much more.159 The new amendment in effect prohibits requiring 
such additional information when applying for a zone change to 
construct affordable housing. This provides significant protection 
for an affordable housing application being heard by an unsympa­
thetic commission endlessly demanding more information-a pro­
cedure which significantly increases the start up costs that must be 
incurred before the developer knows whether an approval is even 
possible. 
On the other hand, two of the members of the Second Blue 
Ribbon Commission, speaking at a Connecticut Bar Association 
sponsored conference discussing the amendments to section 8-30g, 
managed to expand the definition of what might "logically" be re­
quired in the Conceptual Site Plan. According to them, such plans 
should include, for example, improvements to off-site traffic pat­
terns; "[t]opographical information on existing and final grades ... 
and estimated amount of blasting;" location of wetlands, streams, 
and proposed utility lines; location of pedestrian walks; floor plans 
of all units proposed; report on existing and proposed storm water 
distribution, including the capability of off-site drainage facilities; an 
analysis that assures that remaining sewer line capacity after devel­
opment would be sufficient to accommodate a reasonable build out 
under the town's plan of development, etc.l60 One superior court 
decision provides the justification for much of this imposing list.161 
All of this information and more is justifiably required before the 
commission approves an application, of course. But the statute sim­
ply requires a "Conceptual" Site Plan. To transform this into the 
expensive generation of information suggested when the initial ap­
158. 2000 Conn. Acts at 964 (new § 8-30g(c». 
159. For an example of a conceptual site plan regulation requiring more, see the 
site plan regulation for Fairfield, Connecticut, quoted in SSM Associates Ltd. Partner­
ship v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 545 A.2d 602, 604 n.4 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988), affd, 
559 A.2d 196 (Conn. 1989) (stating that the site plan required information on the pro­
posal's impact on, inter alia, the "appearance and beauty of the community"). 
160. Richard Redness & Diane Fox, Conceptual Site Plans under the Amended 
Statute, in Understanding the Amendments of the Connecticut Affordable Housing 
Statute (Sept. 8, 2000) (unpublished manuscript at 94-95) (on file with author). 
161. See Fairfield 2000 Homes Corp. v. Town of Newtown Planning & Zoning 
Comm'n, No. CV9705787565, 1999 WL 186768, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 1999) 
(holding that a zoning commission may deny an application based on environmental 
harm to the residences). 
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plication for a zone change is made-unless that zone change is the 
only approval the developer needs in order to commence construc­
tion-is to impose a significant burden on an affordable housing 
developer before there is any indication as to whether the idea is 
remotely acceptable. The requirement is even more suspect when it 
is not imposed on market rate construction. 
The other major change adopted by the Second Blue Ribbon 
Commission was the creation of a limited moratorium procedure to 
shield towns from section 8-30g lawsuits if they are in fact approv­
ing affordable housing projects, even though the percentage of af­
fordable housing units in the town is less than 10% of the town's 
housing stock. The original version of section 8-30g included a 1­
year moratorium for towns participating in an affordable housing 
compact, but this provided no incentive to a town that was attempt­
ing to increase its amount of affordable housing.162 For example, 
using the old moratorium's formula and applying it to Glaston­
bury's housing stock numbers for the year 2000, 125 units of afford­
able housing would have to be added to its housing stock for it to 
gain a 1 year exemption, after which it would become subject to 
section 8-30g lawsuits again. That is a very large number of new 
units to be added to the housing stock of a town the size of Glaston­
bury in 1 year. 
The new moratorium provision increases the length of the mor­
atorium on section 8-30g lawsuits to 3 years, a more realistic period 
of time in which to demand a significant increase in affordable 
housing stock if the moratorium is to continue.163 To be entitled to 
the moratorium, the Commissioner of Economic and Community 
Development must issue a certification of completion for a certain 
number of affordable housing units. l64 The number is arrived at by 
a complicated point formula that provides differing point levels 
based on whether the unit is owned or rented, whether the rent or 
payment levels are appropriate for persons earning 80% or 60% of 
the area's median income, or whether the unit is a market rate unit 
in an affordable housing development.165 Units of housing built 
since the effective date of section 8-30g are counted in the point 
accumulations, providing a sort of ex post facto reward for those 
towns that did allow the construction of affordable housing during 
162. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(g) (1999). 
163. 2000 Conn. Acts at 967. 
164. [d. 
165. [d. at 967-68. 
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the last 10 years even though no effective reward then existed for 
doing SO.166 The town is not shielded from section 8-30g lawsuits, 
however, if the rejected application is for an affordable housing de­
velopment in which the affordable units are government-assisted, 
and either there are 40 or fewer dwelling units (market rate or as­
sisted), or 95% of the units are restricted to persons whose income 
is 60% or less of the area's median income.167 
The Commission was successful in reversing the unfortunate 
holding in Christian Activities Council, Congregational that the 
"sufficient evidence" standard required specifically in section 8­
30g(c)(1)(A), also applies by implication to subsections (B), (C), 
and (D) which do not specify any evidentiary standard.168 A suffi­
cient evidence standard requires less from the commission, which 
carries the burden of supporting its decision, than would the more 
usual preponderance of the evidence standard. The plaintiff in 
Christian Activities Council, Congregational argued that subsections 
(B), (C), and (D) require the town to carry its burden by a prepon­
derance of the evidence, since that is the traditional standard.169 
The court disagreed, finding that by close textual analysis it could 
be seen that all four sections were interrelated and hence the lesser 
"sufficient evidence" standard applied in all four instances.17o The 
Christian Activities Council, Congregational interpretation leads to 
the anomalous situation in which a remedial statute designed to in­
crease the amount of affordable housing ends up requiring a less 
demanding standard of judicial review of a commission's adverse 
decision than is presently required for similar land use decisions not 
involving affordable housing.l7l The Blue Ribbon Commission rec­
ommended the reversal of that interpretation, and the legislature 
agreed; a period was placed at the end of section 8-30g(c)(1)(A) 
replacing the semicolon in the original legislation, to emphasize that 
the sufficient evidence standard does not apply to subsections 
166. Id. 
167. Id. For a clear example of how the point calculations are to be made see 
Raphael Podolsky & Brian Miller, Moratorium Eligibility Under P.A. 00-206, in Under­
standing the Amendments of Connecticut's Affordable Housing Statute, supra note 162 
(manuscript at 175). 
168. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council, 735 A.2d 231, 
239-46 (Conn. 1999). 
169. Id. at 239-40. 
170. Id. 
171. BRC II, supra note 11, at 12, 29 (recommending a clarification of the judicial 
review standard and discussing the significance of this recommendation by the propos­
ing subcommittee). 
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(c)(l)(B), (C), and (D).172 
A potential problem remains, however, since the legislature re­
fused to adopt the second Blue Ribbon Commission Report's rec­
ommendation number 7, which would have modified "need" in 
section 8-30g(c)(1)(C) of the Connecticut General Statutes173 so 
that the need would be determined regionally rather than locally or 
statewide.174 The Commission's change would have reversed the 
holding in Christian Activities Council, Congregational that the un­
defined word "need" meant local or municipal need. Members of 
the second Blue Ribbon Commission decided not to press for the 
addition of the word "regional," however, since the Connecticut 
zoning statutes already required a regional focus for land use deci­
sions. Section 8-2 requires zoning regulations to "encourage the de­
velopment of housing opportunities . . . for all residents of the 
municipality and the planning region in which the municipality is 
located. "175 Identical language is in section 8-23, concerning the 
town's plan of conservation and development which section 8-2 in 
turn requires a zoning commission to consider when it adopts zon­
ing regulations.176 Thus, satisfaction of the region's housing needs 
is already required of Connecticut towns, contrary to the narrow 
interpretation of "need" III Christian Activities Council, 
Congregational. 
VII. CRITIQUE OF SECTION 8-30g 
Several shortcomings in the Appeals Act became apparent 
during the decade after its initial enactment. None were success­
fully addressed by the second Blue Ribbon Commission, because it 
is not easy to determine how to resolve these difficulties. 
First, we did not consider how to limit a town's ability to block 
affordable housing proposals by refusing to supply the necessary 
infrastructure for an affordable housing development. Without 
public sewers, for example, at least an acre of land is required for 
each dwelling unit; with public sewers, the density limitation be­
comes unimportant and the cost of housing units drops. The Ap­
peals Act does not apply to appeals from local water and sewer 
172. Act effective Oct. 1, 2000, Pub. Act No. 00-206, 2000 Conn. Acts 962, 965 
(Reg. Sess.). 
173. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(c)(1)(C) (1999) (providing that "such public in­
terests clearly outweigh the need for affordable housing"). 
174. BRC II, supra note 11, at 10. 
175. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-2(a) (1999). 
176. § 8-23( a). 
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commissions. In fact, it is well established that decisions of water 
and sewer commissions are virtually unappealable. l77 Moreover, 
Connecticut passed a "sewer avoidance law" in the 1970s, which 
encourages towns to avoid building sewers because of the increased 
population densities and concomitant environmental problems that 
seemed likely to followP8 
Second, we did not figure out how to deal with neighbors. 
They have intervened in several of the court cases, in at least one of 
which the town and developer had already agreed to a much-nego­
tiated plan only to have the neighbors object.179 Neighbors can 
often win simply by delaying a project. 
Third, eminent domain has turned out to be an unassailable 
technique for defeating an affordable housing development. At 
least 5 towns have now used eminent domain to condemn a site that 
is the subject of an affordable housing application. This is a costly 
defense of a town's "right" to exclude the poor, but it does work 
and until recently has been judicially approved.180 
Fourth, expert testimony (i.e., the development would pollute 
groundwater at the proposed location) will be the primary means 
by which a town can carry its burden of proving that its rejection of 
an application was not pretextual. It is quite surprising, therefore, 
to see how casually towns have defended their decisions on points 
that they probably could have carried if they had brought in an ex­
pert on their side. The Connecticut rule provides that the commis­
sion can believe or disbelieve an expert if it wishes, but it can only 
reject an application that is supported by expert testimony by rely­
ing on experts who support an opposing view.181 For a relatively 
small expenditure, a town could hire an expert to appear before the 
177. See Archambault v. Water Pollution Control Auth., 523 A.2d 931, 933-34 
(Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (applying a legislative standard for review of WPCA decisions 
on the extension of sewers, and holding that the municipality has discretion to decide 
where sewers will and will not go, subject to judicial review only for "fraud, oppression, 
or arbitrary action"). See generally Lord, Sewers and Growth Control (1996) (unpub­
lished paper) (on file with author). 
178. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-245 to 7-250 (1999). 
179. Centennial Dev., Inc. v. Town of Farmington, No. CV 92-0517405S, 1993 
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1511, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 9, 1993). 
180. See Peter Rock Assocs. v. Town of North Haven, 756 A.2d 335, 345 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1998); Glastonbury Affordable Hous. Dev., Inc. v. Town Council, No. CV94 
0543581, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 52342, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 1996). But 
see Avalonbay Cmtys., Inc. v. Town of Orange, No. CV 99065826, 2000 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 372, at *26 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 2000). 
181. E.g., Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency (Greenwich), 525 
A.2d 940, 948-49 (Conn. 1987). 
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commission to provide support for its view and would have an ex­
cellent chance of winning any appeal if one is taken. 
Fifth, the FHA will not insure any mortgage for a property that 
is subject to resale restrictions, such as a limitation on a unit's resale 
price.182 Yet, without being able to impose a resale restriction on 
the developer and its tenants or buyers, a town probably cannot 
ensure that any density bonus it gives the affordable housing devel­
oper will not make its way into the developer's pocket (as it might if 
the developer were free to rent or sell the affordable housing units 
at full market price). HUD has, in effect, given towns a very simple 
means of stopping affordable housing proposals; the town simply 
requires a resale restriction, and the developer cannot get insurance 
from HUD. Some developers have persuaded banks to forego 
HUD insurance by observing that funding for affordable housing 
will look good on Community Reinvestment Act reports.183 There 
may be other strategies, but, when pressed, HUD reportedly insists 
that its policy must prevail. 
Finally, some "carrots" were provided in the first Blue Ribbon 
Commission Report-primarily economic incentives. These were 
all underfunded or not funded at all. In addition, however, we 
should have added other rewards for encouraging affordable hous­
ing-most obviously exempting towns from the reach of the Ap­
peals Act if they are actively complying with an acceptable 
affordable housing development plan like the first Capitol Region 
Housing Compact. The exemption should be finely tuned to take 
into account the number of units approved, for example, and the 
degree to which that approval increased the town's supply of af­
fordable housing. 
CONCLUSION 
Connecticut seems to have accepted the Appeals Act's crea­
tion of an enforceable obligation on towns to consider affordable 
housing applications as a separate class of applications which can­
not be rejected for the usual reasons. This is a sea-change from 10 
years ago, when nearly half the legislators voted against the adop­
tion of section 8-30g even when it was part of a package with ext en­
182. See 24 c.F.R. § 203.41(b) (2000) for the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development policy against restrictions on the use of properties that the federal 
government insures through the FHA. 
183. See 12 U.S.c. § 2906(a) (1994) (requiring banks to file reports on the 
amount of loans they have made to the communities in which their branches are 
located). 
2001] CONNECTICUT'S AFFORDABLE HOUSING APPEALS STATUTE 161 
sive (though, as it turned out, never fulfilled) commitments to 
provide funding and bonuses to towns that approved affordable 
housing projects. Moreover, the legislature did not attempt to over­
ride the part of the Supreme Court's decision in Christian Activities 
Council, Congregational that changed the entrenched rule that 
commissions did not have to give reasons for their decisions (as 
long as a court reviewing the case could find evidence to support 
the decision). That will go a long way toward leveling the field on 
which the applicant and commission are playing. 
At the same time, the Appeals Act has been transformed. 
When adopted 10 years ago, the primary thrust of the Appeals Act 
was to reduce housing costs at the lower end of the income scale. 
We attempted to reduce the delays in municipal approval proce­
dures that increased housing costs; we added a technique-the 
builder's remedy-that allowed a pecuniarily interested party to 
challenge a dilatory commission or a commission that was other­
wise hostile to the building of affordable housing in its town; we 
provided a procedure whereby towns and developers could negoti­
ate to accommodate each other's interests; and we did not demand 
much from the town-an affordable housing project could be 
turned down for any sound planning reason that rested on facts es­
tablished in the decisional record. We did not establish any new 
governmental agency as both Massachusetts and New Jersey had 
done, nor did we increase the paperwork required to process an 
affordable housing application as New Jersey had done. 
The Appeals Act as amended in 2000 changes the focus from 
reducing housing costs to increasing the number of the truly poor 
who will benefit from the Appeals Act's appeals procedure. The 
old Appeals Act could be satisfied with a minimum number of low­
income housing units, and these were usually only affordable to the 
very upper end of lower-income people. No unit needed to be de­
signed to sell or rent to persons with incomes below 80% of the 
area median income. Now at least 15% of the residents of a set­
aside affordable housing development (a development built without 
governmental financial assistance) must have incomes not exceed­
ing 60% of the area's median income.184 This downward shift in the 
income level of the popUlation benefiting from the Appeals Act is 
good, of course, but the Appeals Act now encourages development 
of housing that is more like that built under the nearly defunct pub­
184. Act effective Oct. 1, 2000, Pub. Act No. 00-206, 2000 Conn. Acts 962, 963 
(Reg. Sess.). 
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lic housing program, rather than a mechanism for reducing housing 
costs at the lower (not lowest) end of the income spectrum. 
A major consequence of the increased subsidy that becomes 
necessary to provide housing for the very poor is that the subsidy 
can no longer be provided very easily by cross-subsidies from the 
market rate units in an affordable housing development. Builders 
seeking to use the Act will be much more dependent on securing 
governmental subsidies to make up the difference between what 
the tenants can pay and what the housing actually costs. With that 
greater dependency comes more forms and paperwork-and in 
fact, the forms and paperwork and calculations necessary to qualify 
a project as affordable have been built into the Act itself, even if 
governmental subsidies are not sought. The new paperwork re­
quirements include a Conceptual Site Plan,185 which must be sub­
mitted with the initial application for a zone change; an 
Affordability Plan;186 a calculation of points a municipality has 
earned toward a moratorium on the ability of developers to invoke 
the section 8-30g procedure (certain applications are excepted);187 
and an Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Plan.188 
Some of these adaitional requirements are designed to estab­
lish greater protection for interests intended to be protected by the 
original Appeals Act. That act did implicitly have a goal of racially 
and economically integrating the suburbs.189 That goal is explicit in 
the new Fair Housing Marketing Plan requirement, in the lowering 
of the income of the targeted population and the accompanying in­
come certifications required to ensure that the lowered income 
levels are met, as well as in the requirement for the preparation of 
the Affordability Plan.190 Nonetheless, the increased paperwork 
will increase housing costs and will discourage private initiatives for 
affordable housing development. The Second Blue Ribbon Com­
mission recognized that the increased number of units that must be 
provided to persons earning only 60% of the area income, and the 
increased percentage of units that had to be set-aside as affordable 
(from 25% to 30%), might actually reduce the number of low-in­
185. /d. at 964. 
186. Id. at 963. 
187. Id. at 967. 
188. Id. at 963. 
189. Phillip Tegeler. The Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Plan, in Under­
standing the Amendments of the Connecticut Affordable Housing Statute, supra note 
162 (manuscript at 131-36). 
190. 2000 Conn. Acts at 963. 
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come units produced: "[ilt is possible that the cumulative changes 
proposed to make even more of the housing proposed under the 
statute affordable, may prove to be a disincentive to private devel­
opers."191 Nonetheless, the Commission adopted these heightened 
requirements because "the benefits of providing additional units for 
lower income households was determined to outweigh the risk."l92 
Some of the members of. the first Blue Ribbon Commission 
had hoped that section 8-30g would provide a framework within 
which developers and commissions could find a way to work out 
their differences over affordable housing applications without 
resorting to the expense and delay of litigation.193 We expected 
that if we constrained the town's ability to stonewall an affordable 
housing application, an affordable housing developer could be en­
ticed into making compromises of its own to respond to the town's 
stated problems with the application. All we .did was to require the 
town to give good planning reasons for its decision, so that the de­
veloper could respond to those reasons (if possible to do so). We 
emphasized the importance of negotiations, by entitling the devel­
oper to resubmit a disapproved application with changes, and have 
that resubmitted application placed on a fast track to approval, or 
disapproval followed by judicial review. We thought that simply re­
quiring the town to state a good planning reason would reduce the 
volatility and knee-jerk reactions toward affordable housing 
proposals. 
We were naIve. When Danbury's application rejection was re­
versed by the Supreme Court because the town's reasons were dis­
puted by the uncontradicted testimony of the town engineer 
(testifying for the town), Danbury's Planning Director complained 
that section 8-30g was "written by people who don't understand 
zoning."194 Was he saying that zoning is understood as doing 
whatever the town wants regardless of the law or of rules of evi­
dence? Moreover, one would think that a statute that reinforced 
the need for town commissions to produce decisions anchored in 
good planning practices would cheer anyone interested in strength­
ening planning as a fundamental part of zoning. Instead, more than 
a few planners complained that requiring the town to give good 
191. BRC II, supra note 11, at 23-24. 
192. Id. 
193. BRC I, supra note 4, at 11-12. 
194. Peter J. Vodola, Post-Litigation Results of Affordable Housing Land Use 
Appeals: A Survey of Statistics and Opinions Concerning Decisions Based on the Act, 
1990-1994, at 19 (Jan. 7, 1995) (unpublished paper, on file with author). 
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planning reasons for its decisions forced the town to give up all con­
trol over how town land was used. 
Section 8-30g began as an effort to simplify the zoning proce­
dures governing affordable housing development applications and 
to encourage developers and commissions to negotiate more and 
litigate less. The biggest breakthrough has been the adoption by 
the Connecticut Supreme Court of the rule that land use commis­
sions must state the reasons for their decisions. This requirement 
will not simplify the application process for affordable housing de­
velopments, but it will remove a significant part of a town's ability 
to turn down affordable housing developments for improper rea­
sons. This should encourage commissions to negotiate more with 
developers, which should shorten the time necessary to produce af­
fordable housing projects. This should in turn reduce the cost of 
producing affordable housing. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has sanctioned the use 
of unsupported assertions as "reasons" for rejecting affordable 
housing projects. The second Blue Ribbon Commission has in­
creased the complexity of the reviews required for affordable hous­
ing projects, so that instead of simplifying these applications we 
have burdened them even more than before. The statute's attempt 
to reduce the level of government intrusion into property law 
claims has gone in the other direction. Even though the 1980s was 
in general a period of increasing interest in reducing the level of 
government intrusion in our lives, that greater acceptance of free 
market solutions did not extend to zoning and planning law. That 
law evidently strikes too close to home for us to want to take the 
risks of less regulation. We want assurance that the regulators will 
be our friends and neighbors. 
